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[S]o we have to eat crow no matter what we do. Right?'
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's understanding and enforcement of the Tak-
ings Clause got unexpectedly weird in its October 2004 term.' Not so
long ago, following the Supreme Court's four takings decisions in its
1986-87 term and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission (1992) ,
the Takings Clause appeared ready to serve as a tool for the rollback
of the regulatory state. This vision proved illusory. Instead of a
Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005)
(No. 04-163), 2005 WL 529658 (Scalia, J.).
, The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause provides: "nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. It serves both to limit the exer-
cise of eminent domain and to require compensation for confiscatory regulations, and its appli-
cation extends to state and federal governments. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago,
166 U.S. 226, 239, 241 (1897) (explaining how the Fourteenth Amendment limits the power of
States to appropriate private property for public use and requires "making due compensation
for whatever is taken"); DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 2-5 (2002)
("The Takings Clause is unique in requiring compensation in conjunction with the exercise of a
certain type of governmental power-eminent domain .... ").
See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836-42 (1987) (holding that the condi-
tion that a property owner dedicate an easement to the public in order to receive land-use ap-
proval effected a taking because the easement failed to bear an essential nexus to the govern-
ment's purpose in requiring condition); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County
of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 317-19 (1987) (stating that the remedy for a regulatory takings
violation is compensation, and that a property owner may recover damages for a taking during
the period in which the regulation was in place); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716-18 (1987)
(determining that a federal program requiring small fractional ownership interests in tribal
land to escheat to a tribe upon the owner's death effected a taking by seizing one of the essen-
tial rights of property ownership, the right to pass on property to one's heirs); Keystone Bitu-
minous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987) (holding that legislation requiring
coal companies to leave coal in place where mining would cause subsidence of surface did not
effect a taking).
4 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (holding that a "regulation [that] denies all economically
beneficial or productive use of land" effects a taking). The property owner won in Lucas, and
property owners won three of the four decisions in the 1986-87 term (Nollan, First English, and
Hodel), while the only government victory was in Keystone Bituminous, a seemingly anomalous
decision that appeared to reverse the result in the first modern takings case, decided by Justice
Holmes in 1922, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
' This perception was most closely associated with Richard Epstein's influential book, Tak-
ings. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
(1985). See generally Molly S. McUsic, Looking Inside Out: Institutional Analysis and the Problem of
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sharp, anti-statist tool, by October 2004 the regulatory takings doc-
trine had come to resemble a sprawling experimental novel-poised
to resolve the deepest conflicts of modern life, yet filled with repeti-
tious and highly technical language that has never fully revealed the
doctrine's intent and implications, and understood only by adepts
able to master its subtle intricacies.6 Judges and academics had come
to expect, if not accept, the doctrine's evolving complexity. At the
same time, the Public Use Clause's prospects as a substantive limit on
the exercise of eminent domain appeared dormant, if not dead.7 But
in three decisions issued in May and June 2005, the Court signaled
broad consensus favoring an end to major doctrinal development in
regulatory takings while it cut the doctrine back at its margins;8 and,
paradoxically, revealed a dramatic and bitter split among the Justices
over the meaning and bite of the public use limitation on eminent
domain.9  And while the regulatory takings cases-which Court-
watchers had once awaited eagerly-were issued with hardly any no-
tice, the eminent domain decision provoked a torrent of public out-
cry. This appears, on its face, to constitute an odd reversal, one that
cries out for theoretical explanation and prescriptive intervention.
Takings, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 591, 641-63 (1998) (offering a political and jurisprudential history of
takings jurisprudence, with emphasis on its increasingly conservative cast after the Warren
Court).
6 Supreme CourtJustices themselves often make this complaint. See, e.g., E. Enters. v. Apfel,
524 U.S. 498, 541 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part)
("[I]t is fair to say [that the concept of regulatory takings] has proved difficult to explain in
theory and to implement in practice. Cases attempting to decide when a regulation becomes a
taking are among the most litigated and perplexing in current law."); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 866
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Even the wisest lawyers would have to acknowledge great uncertainty
about the scope of this Court's takings jurisprudence."); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978) (noting that a regulatory taking "has proved to be a problem
of considerable difficulty"). These complaints are nothing, however, compared to those lodged
in the law reviews. For a recent comprehensive citation to that literature, see Marc R. Poirier,
The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 93, 97 n.2 (2002).
' See Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 61, 96 (1986) (re-
porting that in the period between 1954 and 1986, no federal courts and only a small minority
of state courts held that a proposed taking failed to serve a public use); CoreyJ. Wilk, The Strug-
gle over the Public Use Clause: Survey of Holdings and Trends, 1986-2003, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR.J. 251, 257-61 (2004) (reporting that in the period between 1986 and 2003, the vast major-
ity of federal courts and a smaller, but still large, majority of state courts upheld proposed tak-
ings against challenge under the Public Use Clause).
8 See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 338 (2005) (stat-
ing that under the full faith and credit statute, a plaintiff whose federal regulatory takings claim
is resolved by a state court is precluded from re-litigating the claim in federal court); Lingle v.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 532 (2005) (invalidating test for regulatory takings that asks
whether a regulatory act "substantially advances" a legitimate state interest).
9 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484-90 (2005) (holding that the "public
use" requirement for exercise of eminent domain under the Fifth Amendment did not bar
city's exercise of eminent domain power in furtherance of an economic development plan that
would result in the use of the acquired property for private development).
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Alas, the search for coherence in takings jurisprudence has re-
sulted in a multitude of theories but no consensus. Each theory-
whether based on conceptions of common law property rights or
constitutional conceptions of justice, or based on utility, natural law,
or communitarian or republican conceptions of the good-offers
significant insight into the vexing legal, political, and normative is-
sues that judicial enforcement of the Takings Clause raises. But no
single theory of property or of constitutional limits on state regula-
tion and expropriation has proven capable either of satisfactorily ra-
tionalizing existing takings law or of persuading the courts or the
theory's opponents that its approach is best. And as with their for-
bearers in the pantheon of Supreme Court takings decisions, the de-
cisions from 2005 failed to confirm the supremacy of any one existing
theory or approach.
The 2005 decisions do cohere-only not in the way we might
think, expect, or even prefer. They make plain that when faced with
the difficult political and jurisprudential issues raised by the relation-
ship between private property and the regulatory state, the Court's
greatest concern is with itself-that is, with the role of federal judicial
review in a tri-partite, federalist system. The Court has abandoned
the difficult, if not impossible, task of providing a clear normative jus-
tification for the Takings Clause in favor of preserving and furthering
its vision of an institutional system of governance. It has preferred to
direct its takings jurisprudence towards the question of who should
decide, rather than towards the substantive issue of what should be
decided. In short, the Court has chosen to adopt a "legal process"
approach to takings-a jurisprudential commitment that did not be-
gin in the 2005 decisions, but that has only become truly clear after
them.
The legal process approach to adjudication, with roots in the con-
stitutional crisis raised by the New Deal, ascended within the post-war
legal academy as an effort to elaborate a legitimating set of adjudica-
tory norms and institutional practices for the modern administrative
state.' ° Several of the legal process school's most significant concepts
form the core of the 2005 decisions. The legal process approach
commanded that judges should rely on "reasoned elaboration" ex-
pressed in fulsome, consistent, and rational decisions;" engage in a
"maturing of collective thought" through the careful, incremental
exercise of common law development;12 and, ultimately, create and
'0 See infra notes 280-84.
" HENRY M. HART, JR., & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 145-50 (William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
1994).
'" Henry M. Hart, Jr., Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 100 (1959).
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protect a self-limiting judicial institution that performs those tasks in
which it is competent. 3 Courts, as one among many institutions of
public and private governance, have specific competencies within
which they have authority to settle specific, narrowly-focused ques-
tions; outside those competencies, however, courts should defer to
the expert decisions of other institutions. The fundamental ques-
tions for legal process adherents concern the "constitutive or proce-
dural understandings or arrangements" and "institutionalized proce-
dures" that serve as the source of substantive social arrangements and
that enable those arrangements to operate effectively.' 4 Thus, the key
questions for courts and legal academics concern which institutions
should decide which questions, and what form and procedures
should be used in those decisional processes. The actual answers to
those questions are significantly less important.
Each of the 2005 decisions inevitably concerned the allocation of
decision-making authority within the institutionalized procedures of
local land-use decision making. In Kelo v. City of New London, an emi-
nent domain case, the Court based its decision most clearly on the
majority's respect for longstanding precedent and on the issue of
whether "public use" is a question better suited for legislative bodies
or for courts. 15 In San Remo v. City & County of San Francisco, the
Court based its decision on whether state courts could sufficiently
and fairly review claims brought under the federal constitutional Tak-
ings Clause, or whether judicial review by the lower federal courts
should be made available to takings plaintiffs. 6 And in Lingle v. Chev-
ron, the Court both settled a niggling doctrinal issue by casting off an
unreasoned test from a twenty-five-year-old decision, and provided an
authoritative elaboration of the precise leal forms that compose the
complicated regulatory takings doctrine. Decided unanimously,
Lingle offered a settled logic, made operational through a mixture of
default standards and categorical rules, by which courts should de-
cide when and precisely how much to defer to the administrative de-
cisions of federal, state, and local government agencies. In sum,
these decisions, which represent a nearly random sample of substan-
tive and procedural takings issues, provide an institutional blueprint
for the protection of constitutional property rights rather than a
definition of the boundaries and normative justification of those
rights.' s
' HART & SACKS, supra note 11, at 696, 1009-11.
14 Id. at 3-4 (emphasis omitted).
See infra text accompanying notes 122-24.
6 See infra text accompanying notes 84-88.
17 See infra text accompanying notes 49-64.
's The Fifth Amendment in fact contains two clauses that protect private property rights
against interference by state actors: the aforementioned Takings Clause and the Due Process
Feb. 2007]
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The Article proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes the 2005 deci-
sions, placing them in the context of takings decisions of the past fifty
years. Part II sorts and summarizes prevailing theories of takings and
explains the extent to which the Court relies on the competing ra-
tionales of fairness, utility, and the institution of property rights as a
basis for its enforcement of the Takings Clause. Reviewing the
Court's stated rationales for its 2005 decisions, I argue that the Court
relies slightly on an abstract conception of fairness, somewhat more
on property rights as an institution, and hardly at all on utilitarian ra-
tionales. Part III shifts towards an institutionalist perspective by con-
sidering, but then rejecting as incomplete, an argument that federal-
ist principles are the principal motivation behind the Court's takings
decisions. In Part IV and the Conclusion, I explain the legal process
approach and demonstrate its remarkable salience throughout the
2005 decisions, and then summarize the descriptive and predictive
implications of this insight. Recognizing the legal process concepts at
the core of the 2005 decisions enables a better understanding of the
frustrations of takings doctrine for commentators, theorists, and
property rights activists, and, at least with respect to Kelo, a large seg-
ment of the American public. The recognition also identifies the
jurisprudential limitations facing the Roberts Court if it decides to re-
invigorate the Takings Clause as a powerful check on state actions.
Clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation."). Although the 2005 decisions and this Article occasionally discuss the Due Process
Clause in its substantive manifestation, my concern with "constitutional property rights" extends
only to how the Court has used its takings decisions to define them. See, e.g., infra notes 49-52
(discussing Lingle's distinction between the substantive due process and takings inquiries). For
a significant recent effort to provide a comprehensive and coherent theory of constitutional
property rights that includes substantive and procedural due process rights to property and the
Takings Clause, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV.
885 (2000).
Furthermore, except when I consider whether, and the extent to which, federalist principles
explain the Court's 2005 decisions, see infra Part III, my focus here is consistent with those deci-
sions in considering only allegations that land-use regulations effected a taking. This excludes
takings challenges to government ratemaking, see, e.g., Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S.
467, 524-28 (2002) (rebuffing takings challenge to the FCC's ratemaking efforts under the
Telecommunications Act of 1996), or fees, see, e.g., Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S.
216, 239-41 (2003) (upholding scheme collecting interest on lawyers' trust accounts to fund
legal service organizations against takings challenge on the grounds that plaintiffs failed to show
any potential net gains that they lost); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S.
155, 160-64 (1980) (holding that a statutory fee for court services that bears no relationship to
the use of the collected funds effects a taking). As I note below, however, the Court's recent
ratemaking decision in Verizon, like its 2005 takings decisions, reveals the Court's emphasis on
the identity and decisional processes of the institution whose regulation is under review. See
infra note 351.
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I. TAKINGS 2005
A. Pre-2005
Viewed as abstractly and uncontroversially as possible, takings doc-
trine and logic prior to the three decisions issued in the spring of
2005 had developed as follows. The Takings Clause text is ambigu-
ous,
9 and the Framers provided relatively little guidance as to their• 21
intent.20 Neither English or colonial practices, nor the views of com-
mentators who inspired the constitutional Framers,22 nor the early
years of the Clause's enforcement by the U.S. Supreme Court and
state supreme courts provide clear evidence of its meaning.23 In light
" By this I mean ambiguous as to at least two key issues: the meanings of the words "taken"
and "public use." U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[Nior shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.") (emphasis added). As to "taken," it was unclear until the twentieth
century that the term "taken" extended outside the context of eminent domain; and, at the
moment that the extension was recognized, the precise point at which a regulation effects a
taking was immediately deemed a "question of degree" that could not be resolved "by general
propositions." Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922). As to "for public use," which
in the Fifth Amendment serves to modify "taken," the phrase lends itself to multiple interpreta-
tions: the phrase might merely limit the Clause's command to eminent domain actions gener-
ally; or it may require the government to pay compensation only when it takes property for pub-
lic uses rather than for private uses; or it may allow the government to take property only for
public uses, while prohibiting takings for private uses. Since the nineteenth century, courts have
settled on the latter plausible interpretation as the correct one. See DANA & MERRILL, supra note
2, at 193-94 (arguing that this latter interpretation has been adopted because, since the Consti-
tution's framing, "private takings.., have been regarded as the essence of unjust government
action").
This is not to deny that "property" and "just compensation" are textually unambiguous or
uncontested. Indeed, "just compensation" may be ripe for reconsideration by courts, just as it
has become an object of innovative study by academics. See infra notes 153-54. But neither
term (at least in its Takings Clause context) has been the subject of significant debate by the
Supreme Court over the past thirty years the way that "taken" has been in the regulatory takings
context, or that "public use" has been for the past twenty-five years of eminent domain deci-
sions.
o See Roger Clegg, Reclaiming the Text of the Takings Clause, 46 S.C. L. REV. 531, 539-40 (1995)
(noting the lack of historical evidence). But see Andrew S. Gold, Regulatory Takings and Original
Intent: The Direct, Physical Takings Thesis "Goes Too Far," 49 AM. U. L. REV. 181, 192-206 (1999)
(arguing that Madison's writings provide sufficient evidence of the Framers' intent).
2, SeeJohn F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significancefor Modern Takings Doctrine, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1281 (1996) ("The first century and a half of private land ownership in
America reveals no sign of the later-imagined right of landowners to be let alone as long as they
do not harm others."); William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L.
REV. 553, 557-66 (1972) (reviewing limitations imposed by English and colonial law on the ex-
ecutive's exercise of eminent domain).
22 See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 2, at 19-25 (comparing eminent domain and compensa-
tion philosophies of Pufendorf, Vattel, and Blackstone).
21 See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Politi-
cal Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 790 (1995) (discussing eminent domain during the Revolu-
tionary War). See generallyJohn F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the Original Mean-
ing of the Takings Clause, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1099 (2000) (arguing that contrary to modern
interpretation, Madison and Congress intended the Takings Clause to apply to appropriations
Feb. 2007]
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of this confusion, two contested issues have come to predominate the
Takings Clause's modern development: the extent to which it re-
quires compensation for government regulation that diminishes the
value of private property (as opposed to the forced sale imposed on
property owners via eminent domain); and the extent to which the
"public use" phrase limits the government's power to "take" property
through its power of eminent domain. 4 These issues were at stake in
two of the 2005 decisions.
With respect to regulatory takings, the Supreme Court has typi-
cally, although not universally, allowed government to regulate
broadly against nuisance activities and thereby lower private property
value without compensation, especially where the regulation pro-
vided reciprocal benefits to the affected property owner." Over the
course of the twentieth century, government entities, and especially
local governments, expanded the use of their police powers to regu-
late a vast array of land uses through a myriad of planning tech-
niques. During this period, the Court had deferentially reviewed
these regulatory efforts' effects on individual property owners, al-
though the Court had developed tests that require courts to apply
more rigorous scrutiny for certain categories of regulations and regu-
latory effects. 26 For regulations that do not fall within such categories,
the Court had interpreted the Takings Clause to require compensa-
tion only when a regulation "goes too far,"27 a standard applied
through "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries. 2 8  Critics of the doc-
but not regulations). The historiography of the origins and early understandings of the Tak-
ings Clause, which matured significantly in the early and mid 1990s and found little evidence of
strongjudicial enforcement (see, e.g., Hart, supra, and Treanor, supra), has since been contested.
See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VicKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 137 (3d
ed. 2005). My purpose here is not to sort and evaluate the various historical claims, but to note
that history does not dispositively provide an absolutely authoritative approach to the Takings
Clause.
2' Admittedly, the narrative provided here ignores issues of just compensation and proce-
dure. I consider these important and frequently litigated issues, see DANA & MERRILL, supra note
2, at 169, 254-55 (noting the frequency of compensation challenges in eminent domain litiga-
tion and the importance of procedural issues for the land development industry), throughout
the Article and omit them here only for purposes of narrative economy.
See Lynda J. Oswald, The Role of the "Harm/Benefit" and "Average Reciprocity of Advantage"
Rules in a Comprehensive Takings Analysis, 50 VAND. L. REv. 1449, 1458-72, 1490-1520 (1997)
(considering the Court's distinction between regulations that "prevent[] a property owner from
inflicting harm" and those intending to provide a public benefit, including public benefit regu-
lations that provide reciprocal benefits); Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of
Underlying Principles Part Il-Takings as Intentional Deprivations of Property Without Moral Justiflca-
tion, 78 CAL. L. REV. 53, 110-11 (1990) (discussing the moral justification principle, which "fo-
cus[es] on whether lawmakers reasonably believed the conduct at issue would be regarded as
blameworthy").
26 See infra notes 64-65.
'7 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978).
(Vol. 9:3
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trine complain strenuously of its incoherence and vagueness.2 Al-
though the Rehnquist Court seemed to shift towards imposing
stronger constitutional property protections, the regulatory takings
doctrine had not changed radically since its re-emergence in the 1978
Penn Central decision. As recently as 2002, the Court characterized
its takings jurisprudence as a consistent effort to resist creating broad
per se rules that would impose strict compensation requirements on
regulatory entities.
With respect to the public use issue in eminent domain, federal
courts did not generally review eminent domain action during the
nineteenth century, and state courts failed to enunciate a singular
approach to the limits of government's taking powers. 2 During the
twentieth century, and especially over the past fifty years, state and
federal courts have allowed government entities to take land and ul-
timately give or sell the property to private individuals for a public
purpose, rather than strictly for public use, so long as the government
could demonstrate that the land was taken for a public purpose and
would result in public benefits.3 More recently, property rights advo-
cates have had some success in persuading state courts to scrutinize
eminent domain actions, most prominently when the Michigan Su-
preme Court reversed an especially deferential public use prece-
dent.
34
See Poirier, supra note 6, at 97 nn.2-3 (citing sources). Some commentators have found
virtue in the doctrine's vagueness, however. See, e.g., CAROL M. ROSE, Crystals and Mud in Prop-
erty Law, in PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY AND RHETORIC OF
OWNERSHIP 199, 219-21 (1994) (arguing that creating well-defined property laws has a cost, and
the benefits may be greater if the laws are less clear); Poirier, supra note 6, at 93, 150-83
("[Tihe vagueness in [the] takings doctrine is quite functional and entirely appropriate.").
Commentators on the right and left have come to this conclusion. See Eric R. Claeys, Tak-
ings and Private Property on the Rehnquist Court, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 187, 220-29 (2004) (expressing
profound disappointment from the viewpoint of a conservative natural rights advocate); Joseph
L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1437-38 (1993) (noting the limits of the Rehnquist Court's ef-
forts to reconstruct property and takings law from the viewpoint of a liberal environmentalist).
" See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 326
(2002) ("[W]e have generally eschewed any set formula for determining how far is too far,
choosing instead to engage in essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
'2 See generally Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV.
203, 204-14 (1978) (describing the minor role for federal courts prior to the Fourteenth
Amendment's extension of Fifth Amendment rights under the Takings Clause to states).
31 SeeJames w. Ely, Jr., Thomas Cooley, "Public Use," and New Directions in Takings Jurisprudence,
2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 845, 850-53 (exploring the decline of the public use requirement).
See County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 783-87 (Mich. 2004), rev gPoletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981) (holding that condem-
nation of land for transfer to private operation of a business and technology park did not satisfy
public use requirement); Southwestern Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat'l City Envtl., L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d I
(Ill. 2002) (holding that taking of land for parking expansion at automobile racetrack was not a
public use). See generally Steven J. Eagle, The Public Use Requirement and Doctrinal Renewal, 34
Feb. 2007]
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The settled context for the Court's 2005 decisions, then, featured
regulatory takings as a complicated but increasingly stable area of law,
and "public use" as a fairly simple, well-settled limit on eminent do-
main power.
B. Lingle: A Reasoned Elaboration of Regulatoiy Takings
At first glance, Lingle appears to be an uncontroversial effort at
doctrinal housekeeping that is intended only to clarify whether courts
should continue to apply "a would-be doctrinal rule or test" that had
been repeated, though never directly applied, "in a half dozen or so"
Supreme Court decisions. The decision is brief, clear, and unani-
mous. Ironically, Lingle is probably the shortest takings decision since
Agins v. City of Tiburon,36 the decision it revises, and the first major tak-
ings decision since Agins to be issued without a significant concur-
rence or dissent.37 Under review in Lingle was Hawaii's legislative ef-
fort to cap the amount of rent that an oil company could charge
dealers to whom the company leased its gas stations. The legislation
was enacted in order to address concerns about the price effects of
market concentration in retail gasoline salesi5 In its complaint chal-
lenging the legislation, Chevron, the Lingle plaintiff, included, among
other claims, an allegation that the legislation effected a facial taking
of its property for which compensation was due.39 For this claim,
Chevron relied upon the first prong of a test that had originated in
the Supreme Court's 1980 decision, Agins, which stated that a legisla-
tive act effects a taking if it "does not substantially advance legitimate
state interests... or [it] denies an owner economically viable use of
his land.,
4 °
After a trial at which each side called expert witnesses to testify to
the legislation's practical effect, the federal district court ultimately
accepted the view of Chevron's economist that the rent cap provision
would not advance the state's interest in protecting consumers from
41high gasoline prices, and would in fact result in a price increase.
ENVTL. L. REP. 10999 (2004) (noting reversal of judicial deference towards eminent domain
actions for economic development).
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 531 (2005).
447 U.S. 255 (1980).
7 justice Kennedy's concurrence in Lingle was very brief and insubstantial. See Lingle, 544
U.S. at 548 (Kennedy, J., concurring); infra note 67.
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 533.
Id. at 533-34.
40 Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1192 (D. Haw. 2002) (finding
from expert's reasoning that oil companies would most likely raise wholesale gasoline prices to
offset losses resulting from the rental cap). The case had been remanded to the district court
from the Ninth Circuit following an appeal of the district court's earlier grant of summary
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Indeed, the only issue for which the district court granted summary
judgment, and the only issue on appeal, was the plaintiffs claim that
the regulation, on its face, failed to advance the purpose for which
the government had adopted it.1 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's application of the legal standard to Chevron's facial tak-
ings claim, and, ultimately, its finding that a taking had occurred.43
Consistent with some state and federal appellate courts' application
of Agins," though counter to the majority of law review commentary,45
the lower courts in Lingle read the test disjunctively to mean that
compensation was due if a plaintiff could show that the government
regulation failed either prong of the test-even in the absence of evi-
dence that the regulation, as applied, diminished the use or value of
plaintiff's property.
judgment to Chevron. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 57 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (D. Haw.
1998). The remand required the court to settle a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the state's rent cap legislation would benefit consumers. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano,
224 F.3d 1030, 1037-42 (9th Cir. 2000).
42 Chevron, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 1014; see also Brief for Respondent, Lingle, 544 U.S. 528 (No. 04-
163), 2005 WL 103793 (focusing almost exclusively on whether legislation substantially ad-
vances a legitimate state interest, while noting only cursorily that plaintiff had been deprived of
property from rent cap); Brief of Appellee, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 363 F.3d 846 (9th
Cir. 2004) (No. 02-15867), 2002 WL 32290809 (same).
" The Ninth Circuit twice upheld the legal standard that the District Court used. See Chev-
ron, 363 F.3d at 849-55; Chevron, 224 F.3d at 1033-37.
" See, e.g., Richardson v. City & County of Honolulu, 124 F.3d 1150, 1165-66 (9th Cir. 1997)
(invalidating an affordable housing ordinance for failure to substantially advance a state inter-
est); cf Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1579 (10th Cir. 1995) (applying Agins test to
conclude that restriction on issuance of hunting licenses to out-of-state hunters substantially
advanced Wyoming's legitimate interest in conserving game animals for its residents); Smith v.
Town of Mendon, 822 N.E.2d 1214, 1221 (N.Y. 2004) (applying Agins test to conclude that re-
striction on development in conservation areas substantially advanced Town's legitimate inter-
est in preserving environmentally sensitive areas); Sheffield Dev. Co. v. City of Glenn Heights,
140 S.W.3d 660, 677 (Tex. 2004) (holding that Agins test remained authoritative and, as such,
City's down zoning and moratorium on development of landowner's parcel substantially ad-
vanced City's interest in avoiding ill effects of urbanization). The Ninth Circuit's approach was
so well-established in that circuit that even Judge William Fletcher, who dissented in the original
Lingle panel, has expressed his surprise that the Court declared it incorrect in Lingle. William A.
Fletcher, Keynote Address, Kelo, Lingle, and San Remo Hotel: Takings Law Now Belongs to the
States, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 767, 772 (2006).
4 See generally John D. Echeverria, Does a Regulation That Fails to Advance a Legitimate Govern-
mental Interest Result in a Regulatory Taking?, 29 ENVTL. L. 853, 854 (1999) ("assert[ing]
that.., the failure of a regulation to advance a legitimate governmental interest does not result
in a taking," although the action may be illegal on other grounds); Andrea L. Peterson, The Tak-
ings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part I-A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine,
77 CAL. L. REv. 1299, 1328-33 (1989) (noting the Court's unclear and unexplained applications
of the Agins test); Edward J. Sullivan, Emperors and Clothes: The Genealogy and Operations of the
Agins' Tests, 33 URB. LAW. 343 (2001) (expounding on problems with the Agins approach). But
see R. S. Radford, Of Course a Land Use Regulation That Fails to Substantially Advance Legitimate
State Interests Results in a Regulatory Taking, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REv. 353, 395-401 (2004)
(claiming that "arguments to eliminate [the substantial advancement test] fit easily within the
broader assault on regulatory takings per se").
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The question presented to the Supreme Court in Lingle was
whether the Agins "substantially advances" test was an "appropriate"
one for determining whether a regulation effects a taking.4  The
"substantially advances" test did not belong within takings jurispru-
dence, the Court held, because of what the test allowed property
owners to plead under the Fifth Amendment and because of what it
required courts to do as part of their review of the property owners'
claims. Having incorrectly articulated the test in the disjunctive as
two distinct inquiries-that is, a plaintiff could plead under either the
"substantially advances" or the denial of an economically viable use
test-Agins wrongly allowed a property owner to allege that a regula-
tory act effects a taking solely on the basis of the character of the gov-
ernment's action, and without reference to whether the act had any
economic effect on the use of his land.47 Furthermore, the "substan-
tially advances" test, especially as applied without reference to the
regulation's effect on the owner's property, offered a dangerous invi-
tation to courts to scrutinize the purpose, wisdom, and functionality
of a regulatory act in an open-ended and potentially rigorous way.48
The Agins test thus fundamentally mistook the nature and pur-
pose of the Takings Clause, and, in the process, made three funda-
mental errors. The first error was categorical. Judicial review of a
government act's functionality and wisdom belongs within a substan-
tive due process test rather than a takings test. 49 The second error
was analytical: the test focused on the wrong details and as a result
mistook the Takings Clause's normative purpose. A complaint alleg-
ing that a regulation fails to "substantially advance" a legitimate state
interest sheds no light on the key issues of takings analysis, which are
"the magnitude or character of the burden a particular regulation imposes
upon property owners" and how such burden "is distributed among
property owners. ,50 A property owner's takings claim must identify
the property owner's loss and individualized burden rather than the
government's mistake. The third error was institutional: the test
misconceptualized the role of judicial review because it "would em-
power-and might often require-courts to substitute their predic-
tive judgments for those of elected legislatures and expert agencies. 51
46 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 532.
Id. at 540.
48 Id. at 544.
Id. at 541-42. This confusion, the Court conceded, extended beyond Agins, and the
Court only began to correct it in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton
Bank ofJohnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), when it disentangled the origins of regulatory takings
and declared it to be in the Takings Clause rather than in substantive due process protections.
See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 541-42 (citing Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 197-99).
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542.
Id. at 544.
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The "substantially advances" test thus miscasts the judiciary as a super-
legislature, able to second-guess and overrule the decisions of elected
officials. As a result of applying the wrong substantive legal standard,
which forces courts to scrutinize the cause and mechanism of the
regulatory act rather than its effects, the Agins test "has no proper
place in our takings jurisprudence."52
This conclusion assumes, of course, that there is a singular takings
jurisprudence out of which the Agins test could be cast-a contested
proposition, to say the least.53 By sorting and reasonably elaborating
history, doctrine, and normative justification, the Court confidently
stated that a coherent regulatory takings jurisprudence indeed exists,
and cast Lingle as an ending-the end, ultimately, of the complicated
common law development of regulatory takings, at least as a major
jurisprudential and political undertaking. It presented this coher-
ence in two ways: as an unbroken historical narrative of doctrinal de-
velopment, and as a singular, cohesive doctrine.
This historical narrative looks substantially as follows. No regula-
tory takings doctrine existed until Mahon, when Justice Holmes ar-
ticulated his "storied but cryptic formulation" therein that a regula-
tion that "goes too far" effects a taking.54 "Beginning with Mahon," a
limited regulatory takings doctrine emerged, requiring compensation
in those rare instances when a regulation is "so onerous that its effect
is tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster."5  Penn Central
forms the key precedent for the regulatory takings doctrine and the
default standard for the judicial review of takings claims,56 and the
categorical exceptions to Penn Central, which identify particular regu-
latory acts as constituting per se takings, are outlying instances, mere
exceptions that prove the centrality of the Penn Central test.57 Viewed
in retrospect within the trajectory of this narrative, the decisions es-
tablishing the respective categories, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
5 Id. at 548.
' Lingle was not itself a radical departure from recent decisions; in fact, it echoed and cited
similar statements by six Justices in Tahoe-Sierra. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 323-27 (2002). But unlike Tahoe-Sierra, Lingle was the rare
takings case that attracted every Justice.
" Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537 (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
55 Id.
See id. at 539 (characterizing the Penn Central factors as "the principal guidelines for resolv-
ing regulatory takings claims that do not fall within the physical takings or Lucas rules."); Palaz-
zolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Our polestar in-
stead remains the principles set forth in Penn Central itself. . . ."); see also Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at
326 n.23 (quoting "polestar" statement from O'Connor's Palazzolo concurrence).
"' For more on the renewed centrality of the Penn Central test following Lingle, see John D.
Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 23 UCLAJ. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 171 (2005); and for
more on the differing levels and degrees of review following Lingle, see Mark W. Cordes, Takings
Jurisprudence as Three-Tiered Review, 20J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1, 3-5 (2005-06).
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Councit 8 (total diminution in value), Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp.59 (physical invasion), and Nollan v. California Coastal Com-
mission and Dolan v. City of Tigard"t (individualized development
conditions that require dedication of land), did not signal a radical
departure from judicial deference-or, as we can now see from
Lingle's sweeping narrative, from the grand progression established
by Penn Central and continued over the next three decades to the pre-
sent.62 Lingle thus appeared to reject any more expansive vision of the
normative purpose for the Takings Clause's application to regulatory
takings beyond compensating property owners for exceptionally bur-
densome regulation. Although this conclusion was foreshadowed in
both Palazzolo v. Rhode Islanat3 and Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,"4 the unanimous decision in
Lingle appears to provide a stronger sense of closure.
The cohesive doctrine looks substantially as follows. A court must
apply heightened scrutiny when presented with a regulatory act
whose effects fall within certain enumerated categories that represent
"functional equivalences" to the "paradigmatic taking" of eminent
domain for which compensation is always required.65 These catego-
ries, which include permanent physical invasions, complete diminu-
tions in value, and regulatory conditions imposing permanent physi-
cal invasions, are narrow and finite in number. But presented with
regulatory acts whose effects fall outside of these categories, courts
must apply a deferential balancing test.6 Because it must look only toregulatory effects, a court adjudicating a takings claim does not con-
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
458 U.S. 419 (1982).
483 U.S. 825 (1987).
61 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
62 Significantly, Justice Scalia's decision in Lucas, seen generally as an effort to depart from
the Penn Central narrative, itself helped solidify it. Lucas first conceded that the regulatory tak-
ings doctrine was a modern invention established first in Mahon as an effort to curb government
overreach and protect private property. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014. What began as an effort to
naturalize the Lucas holding that a regulation depriving a property owner of all economic value
effects a taking unless the government can identify "background principles of nuisance and
property law" that restrict the owner's use of the property, see id. at 1026-32, ultimately became
in Lingle a contained, rarely invoked application of the nuisance exception to a compensation
requirement.
533 U.S. 606 (2001).
535 U.S. 302 (2002); see Laura S. Underkuffler, Tahoe's Requiem: The Death of the Scalian
View of Property and Justice, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 727, 732-36 (2004) (describing the retreat in
Palazzolo and Tahoe-Sierra from Justice Scalia's vision of property rights in Lucas).
See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537-38 (2005) (outlining the two catego-
ries of regulatory action delineated by case precedent that constitute per se takings for purposes
of the Fifth Amendment and therefore require heightened judicial scrutiny).
See id. at 538-40 (noting that outside the relatively narrow categories of per se takings,
regulatory actions are reviewed under the deferential standard set forth in Penn Central Trans-
portation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).
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sider what the "substantially advances" test requires: judicial review of
a regulation in isolation from consideration of its effects on property
and the rights of ownership, and rigorous scrutiny of a regulatory
67
act's wisdom and effects. Using Lingle as the occasion to strike the
"substantially advances" test, then, the Court clarified, solidified, and
narrowed its regulatory takings doctrine.
Indeed, Lingle reads not unlike the final chapter of a mystery
novel in which the detective reveals all of the clues that led to the
crime's solution and faces no contradiction from any of the other
characters-including the police commissioner who doggedly pur-
sued a different theory of the crime.6s To resolve the viability of the
Agins two-part test, the majority cast Agins' disjunctive test out of the
takings narrative by parsing the doctrine's progression and cleaning
up some loose ends. Thus, earlier decisions that either confused the
Due Process and Takings Clauses or that imported due process con-
cepts 6 into the adjudication of a takings claim ceased to be takings
cases. Agins, and its suggestion of judicial scrutiny of a regulation's
wisdom, had been a red herring. We know that now because finally,
after Lingle, we understand regulatory takings as the doctrine that en-
forces only the narrow normative commands of the Fifth Amend-
ment.
C. San Remo: The Settled Institutions of Takings Litigation
San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco7 0 also required
the Court to consider the implications of an earlier regulatory takings
7 See id. at 542 (remarking that the "substantially advances" test does not inquire into the
nature or magnitude of the particular burden that the regulation imposes). In a brief solo con-
currence, Justice Kennedy left open the possibility that a regulation like the one challenged in
Lingle might be "so arbitrary or irrational as to violate due process" rather than the Takings
Clause. Id. at 548 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 539 (1998)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part)). On Justice Kennedy's role in
sorting takings and substantive due process, see Maria E. Mansfield, Takings and Threes: The Su-
preme Court's 2004-2005 Term, 41 TuLSA L. REV. 243, 288-90 (2005).
Here, the role of the dogged police commissioner was played by property rights advocates
who clung to the "substantially advances" test as evidence that a different, more expansive Tak-
ings Clause still existed and awaited exhumation. See, e.g., Radford, supra note 45 (asserting that
the substantial advancement test was a part of the "mainstream" takings doctrine); Larry
Salzman, Twenty-Five Years of the Substantial Advancement Doctrine Applied to Regulatory Takings:
From Agins to Lingle v. Chevron, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10481, 10483 (2005) (arguing, prior to the
Court's decision in Lingle, that the Court used the substantial advancement test as a "cause-
effect" test of regulations that imposed real constitutional constraints on local governments
while it steered clear of Lochner-stylejudicial review).
" See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540-43 (classifying the early zoning decisions, such as Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), and Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183
(1928), as due process cases rather than as takings cases and criticizing language in other deci-
sions that seemed to "commingl[e] ... due process and takings inquiries ...
0 545 U.S. 323 (2005).
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decision. In its 1985 decision Williamson County Regional Planning
Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,71 the Court held that in
order to ripen a federal constitutional takings claim alleging that the
application of a regulation required compensation, a claimant must
"seek compensation through the procedures the State has provided
for doing So. Courts have read Williamson County as requiring
claimants to raise all of their state claims in state court before their
73federal takings claims are ripe for adjudication in federal court.
The San Remo petitioners, hotel owners forced by San Francisco to
pay a high fee to convert their business from long-term residential
rentals to short-term tourist uses, strategically filed and preserved
federal constitutional takings claims in order to have those claims
heard in a federal forum rather than in state court.4 Some federal
circuits, most prominently the Ninth Circuit, had previously held that
where a takings claim has been litigated first in state court in the ad-
judication of takings issues under state law, and state law and federal
constitutional law are coextensive or substantively equivalent, then
the federal court is precluded from reconsidering the issues.7 5 In the
San Remo litigation, the Ninth Circuit held that the California Su-
preme Court's ruling on the property owners' substantive as-applied
claims under state takings law constituted an "'equivalent determina-
tion' of such claims under the federal takings clause[,]" and thus
precluded the lower federal courts from reconsidering the claims
under circuit precedent.
76
" 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
72 Id. at 194.
73 See San Remo, 545 U.S. at 337 (assuming Williamson County requires a "final state judgment"
before a federal takings claim becomes ripe in federal court); id. at 348-49 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in judgment) (agreeing that Willamson County requires a claimant to seek compen-
sation in state court before bringing a federal takings claim in federal court, but questioning
whether that decision was correct). Numerous federal circuits have similarly interpreted Wil-
liamson County and come to the same conclusion. See, e.g., Villager Pond, Inc. v. Town of
Darien, 56 F.3d 375, 379-80 (2d Cir. 1995) (referring to Williamson County), cert. denied, 519 U.S.
808 (1996); Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680, 689-90 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting
that federal relief may be available after seeking claims in state court), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1093
(1994); Nat'l Adver. Co. v. City & County of Denver, 912 F.2d 405, 413-14 (10th Cir. 1990) (de-
termining that a takings claim was unripe because state claims were not sought).
74 San Remo, 545 U.S. at 329-35 (recounting the litigation's procedural history).
See Dodd v. Hood River County, 136 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying the issue
preclusion doctrine). Not all circuits were in agreement on this issue. See Santini v. Conn. Haz-
ardous Waste Mgmt. Serv., 342 F.3d 118, 130 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that it would be "both
ironic and unfair" if the takings ripeness rule precluded claimants from ever bringing a Fifth
Amendment takings claim).
76 San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 364 F.3d 1088, 1098 (9th Cir.
2004). Petitioners' facial challenge to the city's regulations could have been insulated from
preclusion because it did not face the ripeness requirement that their as-applied challenge did
under Williamson County. See San Remo, 545 U.S. at 340-41 ("[P]etitioners were entitled to insu-
late from preclusive effect one federal issue-their facial constitutional challenge to the [city
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For many property rights advocates and takings plaintiffs' attor-
neys, this result unfairly excludes takings claims from beginning inthe ower77
the lower federal courts. Worse, they argue, a claimant may never
have her specific Fifth Amendment takings claim heard if a federal
court finds that state and federal law are coextensive and that the
state court adjudication of the state law takings claim (which was re-
quired under Williamson County) was identical to a federal takings
claim. 8 Where a property owner is convinced that she cannot get a
fair hearing from her state's courts and views the federal judiciary as
her only opportunity for a fair hearing, the preclusive effect of a state
court determination appears to the property owner to be exception-
ally unjust.79 In their brief before the Court, the San Remo petitioners
argued that "'federal courts [should be] required to disregard the
decision of the state court' in order to ensure that federal takings
claims can be 'considered on the merits in... federal court."'' 0
In affirming the Ninth Circuit's decision for the entire Court,"'
regulation] .... " (citing San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 145 F.3d
1095, 1105 (9th Cir. 1998))). Because petitioners raised the facial issue in state court, however,
they did not properly reserve it under England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375
U.S. 411 (1964). See San Remo, 545 U.S. at 341 (discussing San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City of San
Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 106-09 (Cal. 2002)).
7 See generally Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, Shell Game! You Can't Get Therefrom Here:
Supreme Court Ripeness Jurisprudence in Takings Cases at Long Last Reaches the Self-Parody Stage, 36
URB. LAw. 671 (2004) (asserting that the internal contradictions in Takings Clause jurispru-
dence mean that property owners seeking compensation are treated as "second class citizens by
the federal courts"); J. David Breemer, Overcoming Williamson County 's Troubling State Procedures
Rule: How the England Reservation, Issue Preclusion Exceptions, and the Inadequacy Exception Open the
Federal Courthouse Door to Ripe Takings Claims, 18 J. LAND USE & ENvrL. L. 209, 240-43 (2003)
("[P]reclusion doctrines intersect with the state procedures rule to relegate takings claims to
the state court system."); MadelineJ. Meacham, The Williamson Trap, 32 URB. LAw. 239 (2000)
(exploring the practical hurdles of litigating a Takings Clause claim post-Williamson); George A.
Yuhas, The Ever-Shrinking Scope of Federal Court Takings Litigation, 32 URB. LAw. 465 (2000) (de-
tailing the "labyrinth" created by the Supreme Court in takings litigation).
See Berger & Kanner, supra note 77, at 687-88 (claiming that a misreading of Williamson
County by the lower courts has resulted in property owners being unable to find redress for tak-
ings claims in the federal courts); Breemer, supra note 77, at 240 ("[f]ederal [c]ourts [hiave
[t]urned the [s]tate [pirocedures [r]ule into a [c]omplete U]urisdictional [blar"); Meacham,
supra note 77, at 241 (highlighting the difference between the theory and practice of litigating a
takings claim after Williamson); Yuhas, supra note 77, at 474 ("Given the substantial overlap be-
tween state inverse condemnation principles and federal takings issues, this will usually leave
little for the federal court to decide.").
7 See Breemer, supra note 77, at 260-63 (describing California's procedural and substantive
barriers to receiving compensation under state law).
m San Remo, 545 U.S. at 338 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 8, 14, San Remo, 125 S. Ct. 2491
(No. 04-340)).
"' ChiefJustice Rehnquist's concurrence, which was joined by three otherJustices, called for
the Court to reconsider Williamson County's state litigation requirement, but did not question
the majority's conclusion that state court takings judgments have a preclusive effect on federal
courts where state and federal law are coextensive. See San Remo, 545 U.S. at 348 (Rehnquist,
Feb. 2007]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Justice Stevens characterized the question presented as whether fed-
eral courts may "craft an exception" to the Full Faith and Credit Stat-
ute"' for claims brought under the Takings Clause."3 By redrafting the
814question, Justice Stevens neatly rejected petitioners' characterization
of the issue as one of righting procedural unfairness. Framing the is-
sue in this manner and responding to it as refrained, the Court's de-
cision did not focus specifically on the substantive issue of property
rights; rather, the decision and its reasoning involved judicial comity,
efficiency, and a restrained interpretation of legislation,8 5 while the
virtual unavailability of a federal forum raised no substantive concern.
Nothing prevents takings plaintiffs from raising their federal constitu-
tional claims in state court, the Court reasoned, and state courts are
fully capable of adjudicating federal constitutional claims. 8 Plaintiffs
CJ., concurring in judgment) (reiterating that the petitioners are precluded from relitigating
those issues that have already been adjudicated by the California courts).
"' 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000). The Full Faith and Credit Statute provides that "judicial pro-
ceedings ... shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and
its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State ....." Id.
The statute was originally enacted in 1790 as a congressional response to Article IV, Section 1 of
the U.S. Constitution, which states, "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effect thereof." SeeAct of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122 (original enactment
as codified in 28 U.S.C § 1738).
8:3 San Remo, 545 U.S. at 326.
84 The Court initially granted certiorari in San Remo on the question of whether "a Fifth
Amendment Takings claim [is] barred by issue preclusion based on a judgment denying com-
pensation solely under state law, which was rendered in a state court proceeding that was re-
quired to ripen the federal Takings claim[.]" Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *i, San Remo, 125
S. Ct. 2491 (No. 04-340), 2004 WL 2031862.
85 See San Remo, 545 U.S. at 345 (refusing to read an exemption into the Full Faith and
Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000), where Congress has not expressed any such intent, and
therefore applying "our normal assumption that the weighty interests in finality and comity" to
necessitate the dismissal of the petitioners' claim that they needed "access to an additional ap-
pellate tribunal").
86 The Court disposed of petitioners' argument in several ways. First, the Court held that
the reservation of federal claims for adjudication in federal court pending the resolution of
state claims in state court, which the Court expressly allowed in England v. Louisiana State Board
of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964), only allowed reservation and reassertion of federal
claims in federal court when plaintiffs confined the scope of the state court's inquiry to issues of
state law. See San Remo, 545 U.S. at 338-41. Because the petitioners had chosen to broaden the
issues reviewed by the state court beyond those of state law, their reservation of federal takings
claims did not fall within Englands parameters. Id. at 340-41. Second, the Court noted that it
had "repeatedly held" that plaintiffs can be deprived of the opportunity to litigate claims in fed-
eral court if the issues have already been "actually decided" in state court, even when plaintiffs
had been sent to state court in order to ripen a claim. Id. at 342-45 (discussing Migra v. Warren
City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984), and Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980)). To
hold otherwise, the Court stated, would create an exception to the Full Faith and Credit Statute
without congressional authorization. Id. at 345. Finally, the Court asserted that state courts are
"fully competent" to hear federal constitutional claims arising from local land-use decisions and
"undoubtedly have more experience" in resolving such issues. Id. at 347.
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can in turn appeal an adverse state court ruling to the U.S. Supreme
Court-a process that existed long before Williamson County, and that
was the route through which Mahon itself began the modern regula-
tory takings saga.87 If state adjudication of state law claims also re-
solves federal constitutional claims, so much the better-everyone
saves the time and money involved in repetitious litigation. Further-
more, because state courts have more experience at resolving the
complex questions that land-use disputes raise, their resolution will
likely be more expert and fairer than those of federal courts.8 The
Court's understanding of the constitutional scheme and its prescrip-
tion for an optimal system of adjudication commands that state
courts serve as the first, and perhaps only, setting for litigation."s
The Court rejected the property owner's account of Kafkaesque
unfairness-my property has been confiscated and the courthouse
door has been slammed shut!-and substituted the abstract vision of
a functional and efficient system of federal governance. Takings liti-
gation must begin and may end in state court; the courthouse doors
are open, but property owners do not get to choose the one through
which they enter and from which they exit; and, in any event, the
choice of doors for entrance and exit has no significant effect on out-
come. The Court's account assumes that state courthouses are at
worst interchangeable with federal courts and, at best, are better
suited as institutions to handle the state and local issues implicated in
a takings claim. The adjudication of property disputes, therefore, is
subsumed within questions of justiciability, jurisdiction, and judicial
bureaucracy, rather than with a specific plaintiffs concerns regarding
the relative probabilities of receiving a fair hearing in her state or
federal court.
A concurrence threatened the system of adjudication the majority
upheld. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor, Ken-
nedy, and Thomas, wrote separately to declare that he was not per-
suaded of the constitutional necessity of Williamson County's litigation
requirement (as opposed to its administrative exhaustion require-
" See id. at 347 n.26 (stating that "Justice Holmes'... 'too far' formulation", announced in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), "spawned [the Supreme Court's] regula-
tory takings jurisprudence").
" See id.
'o Commentators writing after San Remo have disagreed over the extent to which the federal
courthouse is closed to litigants filing regulatory takings challenges against state and local gov-
ernments. CompareJ. David Breemer, You Can Check Out But You Can Never Leave: The Story of
San Remo Hotel-The Supreme Court Relegates Federal Takings Claims to State Courts Under a Rule
Intended to Ripen the Claims for Federal Review, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 247, 301-04 (2006) (ar-
guing that federal court review is still available for non-compensatory remedies sought under
the Takings Clause), with Stewart E. Sterk, The Demise of Federal Takings Litigation, 48 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 251, 282-83 (2006) (arguing that claim preclusion, coupled with issue preclusion,
effectively eliminates "as applied" regulatory takings challenges from federal court).
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ment) .9 The requirement that property owners exhaust state judicial
remedies before proceeding in federal court instead may be merely
prudential, Justice Rehnquist suggested, and the Court should recon-
sider the expansiveness of Williamson County's ripeness rule.9' With-
out directly challenging the majority's assertion that state courts
could constitute a proper setting for takings litigation, the concur-
rence questioned why they would constitute the only setting-a rule
that Williamson County has been read to create and that San Remo ac-
knowledges. 2 Conceding that the Court had previously held that
some federal constitutional challenges to state government action
were barred from federal court,93 why, the concurrence asked, must
takings claims against the application of land use regulations be rele-
gated to state court when First Amendment and Equal Protection
Clause challenges to land use actions could begin in federal court? 
94
If speech and equal protection could trump the majority's vision of
an integrated, seamless system of constitutional adjudication within a
federal system, why not property?
But ultimately, as with Lingle, San Remo appears consistent with
precedent in both doctrine and spirit. The Court in both decisions
reaffirmed and appears to have further secured its narrow approach
to regulatory takings for reasons of administrative and bureaucratic
competence, discretion, and efficiency. Unlike Lingle's surprising
unanimity, however, the concurrence's invitation to future takings
plaintiffs to present the Court with an argument about Williamson
County's state court litigation requirement in the foreground makes
the approach to takings procedure not quite as secure as Justice Ste-
vens's opinion appears.
D. Kelo: Institutional Competency and Public Use
Returning to issues the Court had last confronted two decades be-
fore, Kelo concerned the extent to which the "public use" limitation
in the Takings Clause restricts government from using its eminent
See San Remo, 545 U.S. at 352 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in judgment) ("[T]he justifica-
tions for [ Williamson County's] state-litigation requirement are suspect...."). ,9' See id. at 350 (remarking that the expertise of state courts has practical significance but
does not necessarily outweigh the Court's federalism interests).
92 See id. at 351 (acknowledging that federal takings claims will be confined to state courts
"in the absence of any asserted justification or congressional directive").
93 See id. at 350 (holding that "the principle of comity ... bars taxpayers from asserting" con-
stitutional challenges to state tax systems in federal court (citing Fair Assessment in Real Estate
Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 116 (1981))).
See id. at 350-51 (citing several cases in which the First Amendment was at issue: City of
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
473 U.S. 432 (1985); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Vill. of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974)).
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domain power to further economic development and raise revenue
in an economically distressed city.9 The petitioners in Kelo were
longtime homeowners who challenged an eminent domain action
initiated by the City of New London, Connecticut: As part of an ex-
tensive economic development plan, the city hoped to redevelop riv-
erfront property and adjacent parcels on which Pfizer, a pharmaceu-
tical company, planned to build a global research facility. The
development plan called for construction of, among other things, a
hotel/conference center, a technology park, and retail space, all of
which would be privately owned and operated. Petitioners' land was
targeted for use as privately operated research and office pace and,
more vaguely, as "park support" and perhaps parking lots. The city
authorized the New London Development Corporation, a private
nonprofit, to utilize the city's eminent domain power to take what-
ever property it could not privately purchase in order to assemble
land for the proposed project.'00 Among the allegations included in
the suit they filed in state court, the Kelo homeowners claimed that
the city's taking failed to meet the public use requirement of the Fed-
eral Constitution because it took land from private individuals only to
give it, ultimately, to another private individual for the latter's private
use." Overruling a state trial court that had invalidated under the
Fifth Amendment some but not all of the proposed eminent domain
actions, the Connecticut Supreme Court, by a 4-3 margin, upheld all
of the city's proposed takings for economic development as actions
taken "in the public interest" and for a "public use."'
Writing for only four other justices, Justice Stevens upheld the
city's actions, based-like Lingle and San Remo-on the weight of
precedent and the institutional settlement and relative competencies
of the political and judicial actors involved in land use regulation and
federal constitutional adjudication under existing precedent. But of
the three 2005 takings decisions that preached obedience to doc-
trinal stability and concern about the correct role for the Federal
Constitution and federal courts, Kelo engendered by far the most in-
ternal protest and external criticism, as both Justice O'Connor,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas,
95 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472 (2005).
See id. at 475.
See id. at 473-74.
See id. at 474-75.
Id.
See id. at 473-75.1 See id.
112 See id. at 476-77 (discussing Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 515-21, 527
(Conn. 2004)).
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and Justice Thomas, writing only for himself, authored vigorous dis-
sents.
The dispute between majority and dissent over precedential au-
thority focused on two decisions: Berman v. Parker (1954), °  in which
the Court upheld the taking of allegedly non-blighted property as
part of a larger redevelopment plan;l° and Hawaii Housing Authority v.
105Midkiff (1984), in which the Court upheld efforts by a state agency
to reform patterns of land ownership in Hawaii that forcibly trans-
ferred fee title from lessors to lessees. A unanimous decision in Mid-
kiff authoritatively declared that the Court had "long ago rejected any
literal requirement that condemned property be put into use for the
general public."1 0 6 Under long-settled law, then, the "public use" limi-
tation would prohibit a "purely private taking" but allow the use of
eminent domain for a "public purpose."1 7 The fact that a taking for
economic development purposes leaves the taken property in private
hands does not render the taking's primary purpose any less public-
particularly where, as in Kelo (and Berman), the taking was part of an
authorized, "carefully formulated," comprehensive plan for redevel-
opment.108 According to the majority, the Public Use Clause merely
sorts eminent domain actions based upon their purpose, not upon
their results or the mechanics of the taking.109
The two dissents disagreed, although in different ways and for
quite different reasons. Justice O'Connor conceded that the tak-
ings upheld in Berman and Midkiff had not resulted in pure public
ownership and use of the taken land, but she placed the majority's
decision outside the limits established in Berman and Midkiff'1'
Unlike the blighted property in Berman, or the oligarchic pattern of
property ownership in Midkiff New London's eminent domain ac-
tions took land for economic development purposes where the pre-
... 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
,o Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484-85 (citing Berman, 348 U.S. at 33-35).
.05 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
'w Id. at 244.
117 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 479-80.
'm Id. at 484-86.
1w Id.
"o Given the strong disagreements in their dissents, see infra text accompanying notes 117-
21, it is unclear why justice Thomas joined Justice O'Connor's dissent-indeed, it seems even
less explicable than Justice Kennedy's concurrence, which appears to depart from the majority
opinion despite the fact that he signed on to Justice Stevens's decision in its entirety. See infra
note 124. I will treat Justice Thomas's dissent as presenting separate and distinct arguments
from Justice O'Connor's, and will not attempt to reconcile them.
. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 498-500 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). To do so, Justice O'Connor was
forced to disavow as dicta strongly deferential language from her own opinion in Midkiff, which
declared that the public use requirement in the Takings Clause is "coterminous with the scope
of a sovereign's police powers." Id. at 501 (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240). Significantly, the
majority decision neither relied upon, nor even cited, this language.
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taking land use did not inflict "affirmative harm on society."'12 Hav-
ing extended those precedents beyond their limits, the majority had
left "public use" a toothless limit that is now unable to invalidate any
eminent domain actions-even one that would take property from
one individual and give it to another for no public purpose at all.'
3
Justice Thomas also conceded that binding precedent required an
expansive understanding of public use, but unlike his fellow dissent-
ers, he rejected Berman and Midkiff as catastrophically mistaken. At
the turn of the twentieth century, Justice Thomas argued, the Court
had taken a wrong turn when it replaced the plain meaning of the
constitutional text's Public Use Clause with an amorphous "public
purpose" test.'1 4 Rejecting a premise upon which the modern inter-
pretation of the Takings Clause relies-that textual meaning, early
history, and contemporaneous commentary are ambiguous and
mixed with respect to the meaning of "public use""-5-he recast the
modern doctrinal trajectory as the tragic result of judicial acquies-
cence to legislative hubris."" Justice O'Connor's understanding of
the Takings Clause, like the majority's, cast the judiciary as a brake on
the worst abuses of legitimate government authority; Justice Thomas,
by contrast, viewed the Takings Clause as establishing a firm and
broad constitutional limitation on the taken property's ultimate
use."' "Purpose" was irrelevant for Justice Thomas; once the gov-
ernment's authority is established under relevant federal constitu-
tional or state law, then the only issue would be the kind of "use" the
government planned for the taken land. If the government or the
public "actually uses the taken property," then it is constitutionally
permissible; anything less, such as land taken for economic develop-
ment and given or sold to a private entity, is not."" Furthermore, Jus-
tice Thomas argued in favor of an antecedent inquiry into whether
the government has the expressly enumerated power to engage in
the proposed eminent domain action at all under the Necessary and
Proper Clause," 9 thereby providing for a far more searching review
12 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 500-01.
'' Id. at 501.
See id. at 515 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S.
112 (1896)).
' See supra notes 19-23, 32, 33 and accompanying text (arguing that text and historical evi-
dence are ambiguous, if not conclusively in favor of an expanded reading of "public use," which
would include takings for a "public purpose").
16 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 506-14 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the most natural read-
ing of public use which would require land to be used by the government or public, is necessary
because of the plain text and historical evidence).
Id. at 509-10.
S Id. at 514.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting Congress power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be neces-
sary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested
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than either the majority or dissent contemplates. 12 0 ForJustice Tho-
mas, Berman and Midkiff should be ignored as "unreasoned" rather
than respected and distinguished or reshaped as precedent.1
2
'
But the Kelo majority did not rely solely upon precedent in up-
holding New London's eminent domain actions. It also concluded
that legislative authority, institutional competence, and the Court's
role in a federal system dictated finding the city's actions permissi-
ble-and in so doing, the Court relied upon concerns similar to
those that had proved pivotal in its Lingle and San Remo decisions.
Federal courts owed "respect" both to the legislative determinations
of the state and local governments that authorized and carried out
the eminent domain action and to the state court that upheld them.
This respect explains why the Court has neither developed "rigid
formulas" nor engaged in "intrusive scrutiny" to second-guess deter-
minations of the public needs and uses for takings by elected state
and local legislatures. 22 Even if it wanted to develop a formal rule for
"public use," the majority argued, it would be too difficult to develop
a practical, enforceable test that would both successfully limit the use
of condemned property for the benefit of the general public and suf-
ficiently defer to state and local governments' efforts to meet the
ever-changing needs of society.2 3 Relative institutional competence
and authority, coupled with the limits of legal form, dictate judicial
deference. Should citizens desire additional limits to eminent do-
main authority, the majority counseled, they could petition their state
courts and politically elected legislatures to provide more rigorous
judicial review under state constitutions or eminent domain stat-
utes. 1
24
The dissenters did not share the majority's concerns about legal
process and form. For Justice O'Connor, "an external, judicial
check" on the exercise of eminent domain, "however limited," is nec-
essary for the Public Use Clause in the Federal Constitution to have
any meaning.25 She and her three fellow dissenters would find im-
permissible "[a] purely private taking" that would, as in this case, take
by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof").
22 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 509-10 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
12 Id. at 523.
Id. at 483 (majority opinion).
2 Id. at 479-80.
See id. at 490 nn.22-23 (identifying states that had elected to limit eminent domain au-
thority). In a separate concurrence,Justice Kennedy articulated a test that would require courts
to apply heightened scrutiny to a taking that the property owner plausibly alleges would benefit
a private party, in order to make certain the taking was in fact reasonable and intended to serve
a public purpose. See id. at 491-92 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Because he also joined the ma-
jority, Justice Kennedy did not signal any fundamental disagreement with the Court's decision.
'25 Id. at 497, 504-05 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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property that was not inflicting an affirmative harm on society and
give it to another private entity. Like the majority, Justice
O'Connor's dissent would defer greatly to legislative judgments
"[b]ecause courts are ill-equipped to evaluate the efficacy of pro-
posed legislative initiatives." 2  Indeed, her approach would pre-
sumably uphold takings that result in either public property (even if
the pre-condemnation use was non-harmful) or that result in prop-
erty formerly used for harmful purposes ending in private hands. 2
s
But for both dissents, economic development takings produce ad-
verse consequences that require correction under the Fifth Amend-
ment: government entities captured by wealthy and powerful inter-
ests will take property from the poor and political minorities,
resulting in the Motel 6 being taken for a Ritz-Carlton. 2 9 According
to the dissenters, immediate and long-term damage to individual
property owners and to the entire institution of private property
trumps concern about such systemic values as federalism and institu-
tional competence.'3 °
The 2005 decisions examined relatively narrow substantive and
procedural issues relating to the regulatory takings doctrine, as well
as a fundamental issue regarding the Public Use Clause. Strangely,
each decision accomplishes something different from what one might
have expected, given the questions they presented: resolving the nar-
row substantive regulatory takings issue prompted the Court to de-
'2 Id. at 499 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984)).
127 id.
' Having so limited her approach,Justice O'Connor failed to reconcile the fact that Berman
upheld the taking of non-harmful land that ended up in private hands. See Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26, 34-35 (1954). She merely acknowledges this fact and seems to approve Berman's
willingness to accept the government's claim that the correct baseline for analysis was not par-
cel-by-parcel harm but neighborhood-by-neighborhood harm, whereby Berman's property be-
comes harmful solely because it is surrounded by harmful uses. But the taking is still of a non-
harmful use, and therefore is inconsistent with her proposal.
29 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 503-04 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas's dissent empha-
sized what he saw as the majority decision's disproportionate effects on minorities. See id. at
521-22 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Indeed, these concerns are well-founded. See Audrey G.
McFarlane, The New Inner City: Class Transformation, Concentrated Affluence and the Obligations of
the Police Power, 8 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 1, 38-50 (2006) (describing the biases of community rede-
velopment in favor of middle- and upper-class development); Wendell E. Pritchett, The "Public
Menace" of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1,
6 (2003) (chronicling the disparate racial impact of eminent domain during the post-war era of
urban redevelopment, and its adverse affects on racial integration). Nevertheless, as David
Dana notes, the political ferment surrounding Kelo focuses far more on the effects of the al-
leged abuse in eminent domain on middle class homeowners. See David A. Dana, The Law and
Expressive Meaning of Condemning the Poor After Kelo, 101 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
," See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 504-05 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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clare unanimous agreement about the doctrine as a whole; resolving
the procedural regulatory takings issue led the Court to agree
unanimously about the judicial process for adjudicating takings
claims, even as it revealed significant unease about that process; and
reaffirming the existing approach to the Public Use Clause produced
not only a bitter, broad split among the Justices, but also a public
outcry against that longstanding approach. When the Court reviewed
the different sets of precedents and reconsidered the particular legal
and systemic questions that these disparate issues raised, it was pulled
in different directions. Each of the three decisions, however, shared
an underlying jurisprudential logic regarding the relative institu-
tional competences operating in land-use regulation, a logic that the
remainder of this Article will explicate.
II. JUSTIFYING TAKINGS LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR COHERENCE
The case summaries and analysis in Part I previewed this Article's
ultimate argument that the Court views its takings jurisprudence as
an institutional check on the legal processes of land-use regulation.
Before the Article explicitly makes that argument in Part III and es-
pecially in Part IV, this Part sorts the prevailing theories that seek to
justify either what the Court does, or what it should do, when it re-
solves takings claims.
Such takings theories abound. Some theorists have found coher-
ence in Supreme Court decisions and either rejoice or fret over what
they discover. Sometimes their lamentations subside a decade or
more later; 1 2 sometimes the reverse occurs and their once-
triumphant tones turn frustrated and despondent.1 33 Others, having
searched for coherence, claim to have found nothing and would im-
pose something better. Still others are strangely satisfied with the
'3' See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Takings, Narratives, and Power, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1752,
1752 (1988) (lamenting that the "dominant narrative" in takings law circa 1987 understands the
Takings Clause as a necessary and powerful constitutional check on local regulators as all-
powerful); Douglas W. Kmiec, At Last, the Supreme Court Solves the Takings Puzzle, 19 HARV.J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 147, 153-55 (1995) (celebrating that the Court's takings decisions articulate a logi-
cal, coherent approach that limits non-compensable regulation to nuisance and landowner ac-
tions that cause harm).
112 See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Ten Years of Takings, 46J. LEGAL EDUC. 586, 593-94 (1996)
(noting the limited nature of the Court's expansion of regulatory takings doctrine).
'33 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Ebbs and Flows in Takings Law: Reflections on the Lake Ta-
hoe Case, 2001-2002 CATO Sup. CT. REv. 5, 28 (lamenting that Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 302 (2002), "has not left us with a pretty
picture").
'" See, e.g.,Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1080-81 (1993) (characterizing takings
as the leading candidate for "doctrine-in-most-desperate-need-of-a-principle prize," before pro-
ceeding to propose an approach that would require compensation when the government "con-
scripts someone's property for state use").
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muddle of it all, finding in doctrinal vagueness and incoherence a
reco nition of property's inherent social and communitarian na-
ture; or they declare this incoherence to be a symptom of the im-
possibility of resolving the intractable theoretical and political dis-
putes that constitutional limits on the regulation of property raise.3 6
But each offers some underlying justification for its normative vision
of takings jurisprudence.
This Part is in some ways a compendium of frustration, a snapshot
of the intellectual spirit that attempts, against all odds, to make sense
of takings as constitutional text and common law, and as a judicial
check on regulatory overreach. Although I concede that my ten-
dency is to appreciate the muddle and find fault in rigid coherence-
if only for its consequences, both anticipated and unanticipated-I
have no axe to grind in this Part.3 3 Nor is my argument that the
search to incorporate and apply some external normative theory
from another discipline to the issue of constitutional property rights
is an irrelevant, irresponsible, or illegitimate move for legal academ-
ics. 13 My purpose instead is two-fold: first to summarize and explain
the most significant efforts to justify a particular approach to takings,
and then to note how the Court has either rejected, ignored, or in-
voked, without conviction, every coherent approach or theory that
commentators have brought to bear on the issues. This Part is organ-
ized around the three dominant rubrics for understanding takings
law: fairness, utilitarianism, and the validation and protection of
property as a social and legal institution.
"' See, e.g., Poirier, supra note 6, at 93 (arguing that the vagueness in takings doctrine is so-
cially and politically beneficial).
See generally James E. Krier, The Takings-Puzzle Puzzle, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143, 1147
(1997) (noting three types of uncertainty in takings theories: (1) differences in applying gen-
eral principles to particular situations; (2) differences regarding what general principles should
exist; and (3) differences in "metatheoretical approaches to arguments over theory").
' Elsewhere, I have argued that the Court's efforts in its two exactions decisions to provide
relatively precise rules to limit government regulations have resulted in a series of consequences
that either fails to further the Court's intended ends or forces local governments to under-
regulate land use. Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and the
Consequences of Clarity, 92 CAL. L. REV. 609, 611 (2004).
"' For general complaints about academic efforts to interpose non-legal disciplines within
legal academic work, see Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227
(1984) (lamenting how legal nihilism can lead to neglect or corruption and urging universities
to accept a duty to limit teaching that may dispirit students); Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Dis-
junction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34 (1992) (com-
menting that law schools' emphasis on abstract theory and law firms' pursuit of profit combine
to lead away from ethical practice).
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A. Fairness Rationales
"Fairness"-which, along with utilitarian approaches, is the most
generally accepted rationale for constitutional property rights protec-
tions -appears in takings decisions and commentary in three
guises. In the Court's most oft-cited rationale for its takings doc-
trines, fairness and justice serve as abstract principles that guide, but
do not mandate or direct, legal rules. In the second, which is a more
prominent rationale among commentators than in the Court's deci-
sions, the Takings Clause's fairness rationale serves to protect the vic-
tim of a failed political process that has left her vulnerable to exploi-
tation by a majoritarian decision. And in the third, which some
academic commentators propose, and which the popular protest
against Kelo illustrates, fairness serves to validate popular or vernacu-
lar conceptions of property rights by protecting the expectations and
norms of ordinary observers.
1. Doctrinal Fairness: General Principles of Fairness and Justice
The concept of fairness in takings jurisprudence-which, the
Court has stated, emanates from the Fifth Amendment itself-serves
as the most significant and oft-cited justification for constitutional
property rights protection. The so-called "Armstrong principle," which
holds that the Takings Clause was "designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fair-
ness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole,"' ° sets out
a basic fairness rationale that helps explain the regulatory takings
doctrine. 14  The Court has also characterized the Takings Clause's
defense against unjust state action as protection from excessively in-
trusive regulation that "goes too far" ,42 or that, in its effects, lacks
proportionality to the public's needs. 143  Unsurprisingly, the Court
'" See Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of Takings, 112
HARv. L. REv. 997, 998-99 (1999) (noting that fairness and utility are the basis ofjust compen-
sation); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
Just Compensation"Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1181-82 (1967) (arguing that redistribution, in
addition to efficiency, provides ajustification forjust compensation).
140 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
44' The Court invokes this language from Armstrong quite regularly, especially in its regulatory
takings decisions. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 321 (2002) (quoting Armstrong); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617-18
(2001) (same); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. NewYork City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978) (same).
'1 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
"' See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999) ("[C]oncerns for
proportionality animate the Takings Clause.... ."); E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 528-29
(1998) (plurality opinion) (finding a regulatory taking where the retroactive burden was "sub-
stantially disproportionate to the parties' experience"). Proportionality appears more explicitly
in the Court's conditional approval of exactions cases, which require that a condition on land
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cited the Armstrong principle explicitly in Lingle, explaining that the
principle's conception of fairness serves a more fundamental role in
Takings Clause jurisprudence than the "various justifications" that
scholars have also attributed to regulatory takings.
An analogous understanding of fairness also animates constitu-
tional limitations on eminent domain. The 'just compensation"
clause requires that the property owner be made whole to compen-
sate fairly for her loss. The "public use" clause, as restated in the Cal-
der v. Bull principle, invalidates the taking of property from one indi-
vidual merely to give it to another.4 5 By favoring one individual over
another, the state imposes a severe burden on the less favored with-
out any apparent legitimate purpose. Accordingly, the state's action
is void, as the Court restated as recently as 1984.' 6 Again, the fairness
principle is so essential to the Court's understanding of the Takings
Clause that the Kelo majority itself invoked the Calder principle, de-
spite ruling against plaintiffs when the government defendant
planned to transfer their taken land to a private entity.47 And the
Armstrong and Calder fairness principles are interchangeable, as Jus-
tice O'Connor's Kelo dissent made explicit.
48
But the invocation of principles may be less meaningful than it
appears. Granted, the 2005 decisions cited fairness as a justification
for their results and for the doctrines they follow and establish. But,
as in earlier decisions, they did so more ritualistically than materially.
Most significantly, they failed to develop analytical or operational
tools that would allow any of these fairness principles to matter.
Kelo is most striking in this regard. For the Kelo dissenters, noth-
ing could eclipse the manifest unfairness of the state's actions, which
in this case led government agencies to force the transfer of petition-
ers' homes and parcels simply because their current residential uses
were deemed insufficiently advantageous to New London's coffers.
4 9
Because of the Court's willfully blind deference, the dissenters ar-
gued, government agencies can now simply take from those with
fewer resources and give to those with more. s If the Court's invoca-
development be roughly proportional to the development's expected harms. See Dolan v. City
of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (holding "rough proportionality" to be what is required
under the Fifth Amendment).
14' Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005); see also id. (invoking also the
"goes too far" language from Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415).
6, Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (holding that it is unjust for a law to take
property from A in order to give it to B).
' See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984) (noting that a taking for purely
private benefit, even with compensation, serves no legitimate government purpose).
"' See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478 n.5 (2005) (quoting Calder).
... See id. at 497 (O'Connor,J., dissenting).
, See id. at 503.
,5 See id.
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tion of abstract fairness principles actually drove their decision, Kelo
would have established stricter enforcement of the Calder principle in
order to protect against a state actor's injustice to individual property
owners-at least as the dissenters viewed both the principle and the
facts in Kelo
15
'
But the majority found the dissenters' fairness concerns irrelevant.
After citing Calder, the majority decision immediately declared that
the judgments of the state court and the state's political branches
were legitimate, and explained that the Court had long ago aban-
doned a strict "use[d] by the public" requirement in "public use"
doctrine in favor of one that allows a taking for a public purpose.152
The Court's focus shifted, in other words, from concern for the
treatment of the particular property owner to a generalized, deferen-
tial analysis of the property's ultimate, post-taking use. Nor was the
Court willing or able to consider any injustice in the compensation
offered to the Kelo property owners (and to others whose property is
153taken for economic development) -an issue that raises the ques-
tion of whether economic development takings are especially unfair,
given the allegedly profitable uses to which the taken property will be
put. 54 Fairness in the abstract may well be one of the Court's consid-
"' See id. at 500-02.
112 Id. at 477-80 (majority opinion).
113 See id. at 490 n.21 (acknowledging the importance of the fairness of compensation pro-
vided but neglecting to examine this issue); id. at 497 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (failing to dis-
cuss whether the compensation in this case wasjust). The compensation issue was raised in one
of the amicus curiae briefs presented to the Court in Kelo, see id. at 490 n.21 (majority opinion),
and, at oral argument, Justice Kennedy appeared interested in considering the compensation
issue in economic development takings. SeeTranscript of Oral Argument at *15, Kelo, 125 S. Ct.
2655 (No. 04-108), 2005 WL 529436. But none of the Court's found decisions, includingJustice
Kennedy's concurrence, explicitly discussed it.
Just compensation is also an issue in regulatory takings actions, in which compensation is
also the constitutionally required remedy. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 307 (1987) (noting that compensation is required in regu-
latory takings of property). For a discussion on the complexity of fixing compensation for so-
called temporary takings, in which a government entity rescinds a regulatory act that has ef-
fected a taking, see ELIJCKSON & BEEN, supra note 23, at 269-74.
'm Critics have argued that current enforcement of the Just Compensation Clause typically
does not include the subjective premium over market value that a property owner would other-
wise have demanded before selling, whatever surplus over market value the owner may have
been able to negotiate as part of the sale (especially if the property that would be taken will be
worth more as part of a larger land assemblage), and the loss of autonomy that a forced transfer
imposes. See Richard A. Epstein, Kelo: An American Original: Of Grubby Particulars & Grand
Principles, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 355, 359-61 (2005) (arguing that condemned property is under-
compensated due to "systematic and institutional biases"); Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent
Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 957, 962-67 (noting that subjective premium (subjective
value less fair market value) is generally not compensated). More specific, identifiable losses
may also remain uncompensated, such as relocation expenses, replacement costs, and, for
commercial landowners and lessees, the disruption to their business and the lost goodwill asso-
ciated with their former location. See Merrill, supra note 7, at 83 (arguing that "sentimental at-
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erations when it reviews eminent domain actions under the Fifth
Amendment, but other concerns clearly overshadow the fairness
principle as a significant rationale.
The same holds true for the Court's tendency to provide quick,
relatively facile analyses of alleged regulatory injustices. Modern
regulatory takings decisions appear to oscillate in their fairness con-
siderations: when it finds that a regulatory taking has occurred, the
Court tends to rely upon a narrow conception of fairness to the
property owner and largely ignores the state's interest in regulating a
proposed use; but when it rejects a regulatory takings claim, the
Court largely ignores any marginal unfairness that a property owner
has suffered. 15 5 Consider the restatements of regulatory takings sub-
stance and procedure offered in Lingle and San Remo. Lingle offers a
logic whereby property owners are likely to be compensated for a tak-
tachment," "improvements or modifications," and the "costs and inconvenience of relocation"
may not be compensated); Michael H. Schill, Intergovernmental Takings and Just Compensation: A
Question of Federalism, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 829, 890-92 (1989) (noting that the compensation ob-
jective is to "indemnify the condemnee," but because the Court has stressed that compensation
is for the property, subjective premiums above market value are not compensated). But see
Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L. REV. 101,
121-30 (2006) (collecting data on government's tendency to overcompensate, especially
through hefty relocation awards). Commentators have proposed various means to address this
"uncompensated increment." See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Bargaining for
Takings Compensation (Bar Ilan Univ. Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 13-05, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract806164 (advocating a scheme whereby property owners' self-
assessments of the property's value would be factored into a compensation figure); Nicole Stelle
Garnett, The Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 934, 963-64 (2003)
(imposing a heightened means-ends test on use of eminent domain power patterned after Do-
lan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 374 (1994) and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483
U.S. 825, 825 (1987)); MargaretJane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 1005-
06 (1982) (advocating blunt imposition of market inalienability on some forms of property).
Some commentators would require courts to consider the particular values at stake when the
government seeks to use its eminent domain powers on the home. See D. Benjamin Barros,
Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 295-300 (2006) (suggesting a higher level
of scrutiny and revised approach to compensation for takings of homes); John Fee, Eminent Do-
main and the Sanctity of Home, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 783, 786-88 (2006) (detailing "the unique
status of the home" in constitutional, statutory, and common law, which "is consistent with phi-
losophical accounts of property as an extension of personhood"). One proposal suggests ex-
plicitly incorporating subjective harm is necessary to affirm the significance of a liberal concep-
tion of "just compensation" in the constitutional text. See Alberto B. Lopez, Weighing and
Reweighing Eminent Domain's Political Philosophies Post-Kelo, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 237, 289-97
(2006) ("Compensating a dispossessed homeowner with nothing more than the fair market
value of the soil completely ignores the unique toll the condemnation extracts from the
owner.").
'5 See Underkuffier, supra note 64, at 747-52. As Underkuffler explains, the Court's blind-
ness to the relational quality of the justice issue in land-use regulation was made easier by the
facts of its decisions in the late 1980s and 1990s (especially Lucas), in which the regulatory issues
appeared technical and the property owner's loss was great. But the three major substantive
regulatory takings decisions of this century, Palazzolo, Tahoe-Sierra, and Lingle, featured either
less sympathetic plaintiffs (such as Chevron) or striking public interests (large quantities of wet-
lands in Palazzolo and Lake Tahoe in Tahoe-Sierra). See id. at 750.
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ing if the regulation's effects fall within particular categories, because
the Court assumes those types of effects represent per se unfairness-
no matter the extent of the injustice and no matter the unfairness to
others of allowing the property owner compensation. If a regulatory
action falls outside of those categories, however, the Court's logic
leaves property owners with little chance of winning-no matter the
extent of the injustice they suffer and no matter the benefits that
others receive from the regulation. Again, as in Kelo, the Court's
other concerns supersede any worry the Court might have regarding
the particular, individualized unfairness that the property owner
claims to have experienced.
The Court relied upon quite similar logic in upholding the pro-
cedural scheme under review in San Remo. In a decision that reached
the opposite conclusion from the Ninth Circuit's decision, which the
Court upheld in San Remo, the Second Circuit characterized the ef-
fect of barring consideration of federal constitutional claims in fed-
eral court under the Full Faith and Credit Act as "unfair., 156 Al-
though it did not expressly reject the assertion that this would be
"unfair," the Court's series of responses-that neither the Constitu-
tion nor Congress has compelled access to federal court for federal
constitutional claims, and that facial takings claims have no ripeness
requirements and can therefore be filed initially in federal court-
failed to consider the appearance of unfairness, especially for litigants
convinced that their state court system undervalues and under-
protects property rights. 157 Justice Rehnquist's concurrence, by con-
trast, characterized the results of Williamson County's ripeness re-
quirements and the Full Faith and Credit Act as "dramatic," especially
when seen in comparison to First Amendment and equal protection
challenges to local land use decisions, which face no ripeness re-
quirements and can be litigated initially in federal court. Thus, Jus-
tice Rehnquist and three other Justices signaled their willingness to
reconsider what they perceived to be an unfair system of adjudica-
tion.18 For the majority, however, logical systems of judicial review
serve as proxies for fairness; the sense of fairness articulated so elo-
quently in the Armstrong principle itself plays little role in the work-
ings of these systems.
' San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 342 (2005) (quot-
ing Santini v. Conn. Hazardous Waste Mgmt. Serv., 342 F.3d 118, 130 (2003), abrogated by San
Remo).
... See id. at 342-47 (analyzing and dismissing arguments raised by petitioner).
' See id. at 348-49 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (distinguishing this case from Williamson
County).
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2. Fairness in the Political Process: Protection Against Democratic Excess
A more precise understanding of fairness, and one that offers a
somewhat more discernible approach to judicial review, attempts to
identify when a failure in the political process has left an individual
or an identifiable group victim to the "democratic excess" of a politi-
cal majority. 5 9 Compensation is due under the Takings Clause, in
this view, when the government takes property from the politically
vulnerable, or from an individual or a small group of people, and in
so doing either violates its norm of providing compensation in similar
circumstances or chooses which property to take based on the iden-
tity of the particular landowner. Precisely when, and on whose be-
half, courts should intervene is a subject of significant debate among
political process theorists-a debate which itself illustrates the the-
ory's relative indeterminacy. One cannot tell in advance either which
types of individuals or groups need greater protection, which levels
(federal, state, or local) or branches (executive, legislative, or judi-
cial) of government are most likely to fail to protect the politically
vulnerable, or who in a particular instance was exploited because she
was politically vulnerable.
6
1
Both the Armstrong and Calder v. Bull principles certainly focus on
the relationship between the state's treatment of the property owner
and of others, and implicit in both is the concern that the property
owner has suffered as a result of her unequal access to an unfair or
undemocratic political process. Indeed, Lingle's summary of the doc-
trine's logic explained that part of the Court's concern in its cate-
gorical takings rules is to protect against the "unique burden" that
particular types of regulatory effects impose upon their victims.
62
The Court appeared to assume that when regulatory effects are dra-
matic-resulting in permanent physical invasions and total diminu-
.. See William A. Fischel, Exploring the Kozinski Paradox: Why Is More Efficient Regulation a Tak-
ing of Property, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 865, 897-98 (1991) (arguing that landowners will be un-
duly burdened by "majoritarian preferences at the local level" partly due to their "political isola-
tion at the state level" and partly due to the "immobility of land" assets, meaning that they
cannot "withdraw from the market").
' See Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279, 306-08
(1992) (arguing that when the government takes from the politically weak, it should compen-
sate them without discrimination just as it would other members of society); Treanor, supra
note 23, at 872 (concluding that compensation is due when without it "there would be a lack of
horizontal equity" if others would receive compensation in similar circumstances).
161 SeeJames E. Krier, Takings from Freund to Fische, 84 GEO. L.J. 1895, 1909-10 (1996) (review-
ing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS (1995)); Carol
M. Rose, Takings, Federalism, Norms, 105 YALE L.J. 1121, 1140-41 (1996) (reviewing FISCHEL, su-
pra).
162 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (emphasizing that although
regulatory takings jurisprudence is not unified, overall it focuses on the nature of the burden
imposed on landowners).
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tions in property value-then the democratic process has unfairly
treated individuals by taking significant property rights from them. 3
In other words, the Court appears to view its functional equivalence
categories as a proxy for instances of political process failure.1
64
But in rejecting the Agins test, Lingle demonstrated that the
Court's focus is not on checking, or even considering, the specific po-
litical process that results in particular regulatory action, but is in-
stead on the actual effects of the regulatory action itself.165 What the
government did and how and why the government did it are not the
key questions that courts are to ask of regulations challenged under
the Takings Clause. Rather, as Lingle made clear, courts should con-
sider only the impact the government's actions have had on the
property owner. Clear, actual failures in the political process are
more appropriately considered under the Equal Protection Clause,
where evidence of the process by which individuals are excluded and
singled out is far more relevant, 66 while irrational regulatory actions
are considered under a substantive due process analysis. 167 The process
itself is not the subject of takings claims.
Furthermore, the "functional equivalence" to confiscation con-
cept that Lingle declared to be the "common touchstone" of regula-
tory takings doctrine is both over- and under-inclusive as a proxy for
political process failure. 68 Not all total diminutions in value, for ex-
ample, fall on the politically vulnerable and voiceless-as the Lucas
decision, which concerned regulation that affected expensive beach-
front property owners and a plaintiff who had been a successful land
developer, illustrates.6 9 Indeed, the Court's rendering of the facts in
its Nollan, Dolan, and Loretto decisions, which concerned plaintiffs who
'0 See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017-18 (1992) ("Surely, at least, in
the extraordinary circumstance when no productive or economically beneficial use of land is
permitted, it is less realistic to indulge our usual assumption that the legislature is simply adjust-
ing the benefits and burdens of economic life in a manner that secures an average reciprocity
of advantage to everyone concerned." (internal citations and quotations omitted)).
"' See Farber, supra note 160, at 303-05.
'" See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542 (rejecting the Agins substantial advancement test because it "re-
veals nothing about the magnitude or character of the burden a particular regulation imposes upon
private property fights .... [or] about how any regulatory burden is distributed among property
owners").
' See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 23 at 156-57 (questioning whether the Takings Clause
is "ask[ed] ... to do the work of the Equal Protection Clause").
67 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 541-42 (distinguishing the Agins due process inquiry as appropriate
for an arbitrary or irrational regulation but not for "discerning whether private property has
been 'taken' for purposes of the Fifth Amendment").
' Id. at 539.
See VICKI BEEN, Lucas v. the Green Machine: Using the Takings Clause to Promote Efficient Regu-
lation?, in PROPERTY STORIES 221, 224-28, 250-51 (Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss eds.,
2004) (detailing the considerable wealth and political connections of David Lucas and the gen-
eral success of beachfront owners in political battles).
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owned beachfront propertyl7° and property used for commercial
gain, 7' do not classify the plaintiffs as members of the Takings Clauseverson f dicree, nsulr " .. 172
version of discrete, insular minoriues. Although the Court never
identified a particularly egregious process failure in local political in-
stitutions, it established rules in each decision that virtually assured
that the plaintiffs would win ajudgment awarding compensation.
Political process theory also fails to capture the results in cases
that fall outside the narrow categories of heightened scrutiny, where
plaintiffs usually lose. These decisions rarely consider whether the
property owners have suffered from significant frustrations with the
political process or were singled out for a special burden. Why has
the political process failed when an owner loses the full value of her
home, even if she is wealthy and powerful enough to seek political
voice in the state and local democratic process, but not when she
loses, say, ninety-five percent of the value or some other percentage
that approaches, but does not meet, the one-hundred percent thresh-
old?
17 -
Even more clearly, political process theory cannot explain Kelo or
San Remo. The Court demonstrated no more than a cursory concern
with the administrative process that led to New London's decision to
exercise its eminent domain authority over the Kelo plaintiffs' prop-
erty; as a result, the majority concluded that the economic develop-
ment plan's careful formulation deserved deference. 74 That the for-
mulation was careful may speak to the needs for economic
development and the rationality of the plan itself, but it ignores
whether the affected homeowners were singled out or lacked suffi-
cient voice to participate in that formulation. And if the Court was
truly concerned about the possibility of local and state institutions
exploiting individual property owners, then it would surely allow
"0 See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 827 (1987) (describing plaintiff as the
owner of a lot between two public beaches).
171 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 379 (1994) (describing plaintiff as a plumbing
and electric supply store owner); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419, 421 (1982) (describing plaintiff owner as the owner-landlord of a residential apartment
building in Manhattan).
"' The focus on "discrete, insular minorities" emanates, of course, from Justice Stone's fa-
mous footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938), and was
extended to a broader constitutional jurisprudence in John Hart Ely's DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OFJUDICIAL REVIEW 75-77 (1980). The takings version of political process
theory traces its history from these texts. See Treanor, supra note 23, at 872-73 (summarizing
the development of modern legal theory, which suggests that process theory may fail with re-
spect to discrete and insular minorities).
171 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1064 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the rule allowing this discrepancy is wholly arbitrary and lacking precedential support); see
also Walcek v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 248, 271 (2001) (illustrating the very high threshold
required to meet the diminution of value test for takings), affd, 303 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
171 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483-85 (2005).
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regulatory takings plaintiffs to preserve their federal constitutional
claims for federal courts-a step the Court refused to take in San
Remo.
3. Fairness in the Vernacular: Social Norms as a Constitutional Baseline
While the Court repeatedly finds an abstract call for fairness in the
Fifth Amendment and has expressed it in the generalities of the
compensation requirement and the Armstrong and Calder v. Bull prin-
ciples, it has failed to provide any precise limiting factor or test. But
doctrine does not exhaust the relationship between property and
fairness in the vernacular expression of property rights by non-
lawyers, as the popular response to Kelo demonstrates. The largely
inchoate public distaste for a Constitution that would allow a city to
take someone's property for economic development is a popular, as
opposed to doctrinal or theoretical, understanding of constitutional
rights, or what Bruce Ackerman famously called an "Ordinary Ob-
server['s]" understanding of widely held social expectations and dis-
puted legal rules.175 This non-technical, non-textual vision of fairness
offers a set of possible constitutional baselines that would fill in the
gaps the Court has left in its open-ended, venerable fairness princi-
ples.
This baseline arises out of what Carol Rose has identified as the
norms and narration that underlie ordinary conceptions of owner-
ship.176  In vernacular expressions of ownership, property is more
than simply a relationship with the thing that is owned, or a relation-
ship with others in relation to the owned thing-it is also experi-
enced and understood as a narrative, and part of a broader narrative
of the self and its relationship to a broader community. 77 When
property is confiscated by the state, or its value is diminished by state
action, the property owner's claims naturally slip into a narrative
structure, one that often features an amorphous but compelling
'75 See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 15-16 (1977) (defin-
ing an Ordinary Observer as one who "elaborates the concepts of nonlegal conversation as to
illiminate... the relationship between disputed legal rules and the structure of social expecta-
tions").
176 See CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY & PERSUASION 5-6 (1994) (arguing that community norms
create popular opinions about property).
177 See generally Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative
Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALEJ.L. & HUMAN. 37, 51 (1990) (hypothesizing a series of characters
whose order of preferences in the distribution and use of property illustrates the various ways
individuals tell property stories). In the words of the editors of a recent collection of essays tell-
ing the story behind numerous canonical property decisions, "our regime of property law
emerges and evolves" out of the narrative conflicts described in "Property Stories." GERALD
KORNGOLD & ANDREW P. MORRISS, Introduction, in PROPERTY STORIES 1, 2 (Gerald Korngold &
Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2004).
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claim that the state has violated her constitutional property rights.
Consider, for example, the following tales:
I purchased this coastal property with the intent to build my beachfront
dream house, and now the state won't let me build anything and the
• 178
property is worthless.
This house has been in my family for over 100 years; I was born here, as
were my children; my son lives next door with his family in a house that
he received as a wedding gift; and now the city wants to take my family's
houses and give them to a large corporation which will tear them
down.
79
Innocent of wrongdoing, surprised by a heartless government's ac-
tion, and threatened with the loss of cherished property, the owner
appears as an exceptionally sympathetic victim whose woeful tale cre-
ates a sense of demoralization in those who hear it.'8° No one's prop-
erty is safe when one person's property is taken in a way that violates
the norms of government behavior. These are powerful, persuasive
narratives, and takings plaintiffs' attorneys and property rights activ-
ists have utilized the ability of the well-told takings story to advance
their legal and political cause.181
Common to these narratives is an implicit outrage at the idea that
an individual who owns property and makes normal use of it can have
", This is a stylized version of the facts in Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007-09.
This is a stylized version of the facts in Wilhelmina Dery's claim as described in Justice
O'Connor's Kelo dissent. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494-95.
" See William Michael Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, The Narratives of Takings, and Com-
pensation Statutes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1151, 1161 (1997) (discussing various accounts of
property takings that cast landowners as innocent actors and the government as the source of
irrational bureaucratic decisions). Frank Michelman originally identified the costs resulting
from the "demoralization" experienced by property owners, their sympathizers, and other ob-
servers following an especially painful uncompensated loss from regulation. See Michelman,
supra note 139, at 1214 (defining demoralization costs in terms of dollar value).
' See Marcilynn A. Burke, Klamath Farmers and Cappuccino Cowboys: The Rhetoric of the Endan-
gered Species Act and Why It (Still) Matters, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'YF. 441, 443-47 (2004) (ana-
lyzing the political rhetoric of property owners and its success in undermining species protec-
tion); Treanor, supra note 180, at 1158-70 ("The property rights movement derives its political
strength from the power of its stories."); Michael Allan Wolf, Overtaking the Fifth Amendment: The
Legislative Backlash Against Environmentalism, 6 FORDHAM ENVrL. L. REV. 637, 641-46 (1995) (dis-
cussing the hyperbole that property owners can use in their public relations battle against the
Endangered Species Act). An especially influential example of the pro-property owner takings
narrative, which Justice Thomas cited in his Kelo dissent, was a report issued in 2003 by the Insti-
tute for Justice collecting numerous instances of allegedly unconstitutional eminent domain
actions. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 503 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing DANA BERLINER, CASTLE
COALITION, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE GAIN: A FIVE-YEAR, STATE-BY-STATE REPORT EXAMINING THE
ABUSE OF EMINENT DOMAIN (2003), http://www.caslecoalition.org/pdf/report/ED-report.pdf
(collecting records of eminent domain actions)). Efforts to counter the Institute for Justice's
campaign, and those of similar organizations, to limit eminent domain includeJOHN R. NOLON,
LAND USE LAW CENTER, PACE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EMINENT
DOMAIN: THE MIGHTY MYTHS OF THE KELO CASE (Nov. 2006), http://www.law.pace.edu/
landuse/Gaining%20Ground%20Report.html.
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her ownership and future expectations disrupted by an unforeseen
regulatory or eminent domain action. A baseline of constitutional
rights from the ordinary observer's perspective must therefore pro-
tect an owner's expectations in both her affective investment in a
narrative of ownership and use, and in her financial investment in
the fungible value of her property.12 This baseline would also require
that the owner's use of her property be consistent with the norms of
community behavior and not cause harm to others. Her property
may only be subject to confiscation if the community's needs are
great and the community has no other alternative but to take the
owner's land. 1 3 A vernacular fairness rule, then, would protect an
owner's normal expected use of her land if it is reasonably similar to
and congruent with the uses to which fellow community members put
their land.
184
But the Court has not adopted either an ordinary observer's per-
spective or a community norm baseline as a general approach to tak-
ings. In Tahoe-Sierra, for example, the majority explicidy rejected the
dissent's effort to consider a temporary moratorium from the land-
owner's point of view, asserting that such a perspective would find
every restriction on use to be a taking for which compensation is
due. 8 5 The narrow regulatory takings categories do appear to con-
sider both the perspective and the baseline: the physical invasion and
the total diminution in value tests certainly have the value of simplic-
ity, and the decisions that established each test dwell on the extent
and severity of the regulatory effect owners experience in relation to
other property owners. s6 As Lingle declared, however, these catego-
... This is how Laura Underkuffler summarizes "common-conception" property rights and
takings. See LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 45
(2003) (asserting that property rights are expected to "protect an area of individual autonomy
and control").
'" See Carol M. Rose, Property as Wealth, Property as Propriety, 33 NOMOS 223, 239-40 (1991)
("[T] his balancing of public gain against private loss suggests that citizens have a duty to give up
that which their representatives think the community can use better than they.").
's See generally WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS
352-61 (1995); Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as
Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 729-33 (1973) (asserting that community standards
should be used to define normalcy); Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic
and LegalAnalysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385 (1977) (discussing limits on suburban growth); John E. Fee,
The Takings Clause as a Comparative Right, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003 (2003) (advocating for a com-
parative approach to property regulation analysis).
' Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 324 n.19
(2002) (responding to ChiefJustice Rehnquist's dissent).
f See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 234-35 (1990) (assessing the Supreme Court's approach to regulatory tak-
ings and characterizing it as relatively straightforward and "clearly in keeping with the layman's
understanding of property"). Loretto, for example, specifically characterized the physical inva-
sion as the "special kind of injury" an owner suffers from a stranger's presence on her land.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435-46 (1981). Similarly, Lucas
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ries are quite narrow; and outside of them, the perspective of the or-
dinary owner or observer and a community norm baseline appear to
be irrelevant. Only an actual permanent invasion, or a total diminu-
tion in value and use, or a condition on development that requires
the dedication of land, enjoy the stringent protection provided by
what appears to be the conception of vernacular fairness incorpo-
rated within the relevant category. Whereas an ordinary observer
would likely see a ninety percent diminution as warranting compen-
sation as a rule, the Court does not. 8 7 Thus Lingle's restatement of
the Court's regulatory takings doctrine, with its default balancing test
and exceptional, categorical rules, seems to be the product not of the
ordinary observer but of what Ackerman called the "Scientific Poli-
cymaker" who "manipulates technical legal concepts... to illumi-
nate... the relationship between... legal rules" and a self-consistent
set of larger principles.
Kelo similarly rejected a popular, community-norm-based concep-
tion. Justice O'Connor began her dissent in Kelo by telling the story
of the displaced property owners from their perspective. She also
emphasized that the Kelo plaintiffs did not use their property in such
a way that it caused harm to others, unlike the blighted property in
explicitly adopted the landowner's point of view by analogizing a total diminution to a physical
appropriation. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017-18 (1992). Lucas also ap-
peared to adopt a community-norm baseline, referring to the "understandings of our citizens
regarding the content of, and the State's power over, the 'bundle of rights' that they acquire
when they obtain title to property." Id. at 1027. Although owners may reasonably expect occa-
sional restrictions on the uses they make of their land, the Court asserted "our constitutional
culture" protects against a regulation that extends so far as to erase all economically viable uses
of land. Id. at 1028.
The Court's exactions decisions similarly turn, at least in part, on the physical invasion cre-
ated by the requirement that property owners dedicate an easement as a condition for a gov-
ernment agency's discretionary development approval. See generally Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512
U.S. 374, 394 (1994) (concluding that the recreational easement would eviscerate the plaintiff
landowner's right to exclude); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (re-
quiring an easement, even without making it a condition of building permit, would have consti-
tuted a taking); see also FISCHEL, supra note 184, at 58 (arguing that the Nollan decision, which
required compensation as a condition of development where the property owner merely sought
to build a house that would be consistent with "normal" California beachfront housing, applied
a community norm baseline).
87 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8 (noting that Takings Clause precedent is characterized by
this all-or-nothing approach); NEDELSKY, supra note 186, at 321 n.82 (differing from Acker-
man's analysis in that a diminution may be seen as a taking by the layman, "even though no
physical invasion is involved").
" ACKERMAN, supra note 175, at 11, 15. As I have argued elsewhere with respect to the
Court's exactions decisions, the Court's efforts to provide, at the margins, an ordinary ob-
server's conception of property (when owners suffer the functional equivalent of confiscation)
have resulted in the legal tests and administrative rules of the scientific policymaker. See Fen-
ster, supra note 137, at 648 (noting this irony at work in the Court's exactions jurisprudence).
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Berman and the oligopolistic land trusts in Midkiff.' 9 The majority, by
contrast, began its narrative of the facts by focusing on the conditions
of New London and on the city's decision-making process,190 and by
asserting that the condition of the plaintiffs' properties was irrelevant
in the face of precedent, as well as the judgments of state and local
legislators and the state supreme court. 9
Perhaps the Court's mere invocation of a vernacular fairness is a
recognition that ordinary observation could not help formulate a
workable federal constitutional test, and an acknowledgement that
this perspective begs as many questions as it resolves. Whose fairness
would be at stake if a Court accepts on its face, and attempts to apply,
an ordinary observer's sense of fairness? Whose narrative counts-
the property owner's claim that her property has been unfairly taken,
or claims brought by neighbors and the general public alleging that
the property owner's expectations should not have included protec-
tion against regulation or a necessary eminent domain action? The
claims of both owner and community proliferate in a regulatory state
where local, state, and federal authorities react to real and perceived
environmental and social impacts from land use, and where courts
serve as a final means for an individual property owner to challenge
majoritarian decisions. And these claims or narratives themselves
produce a proliferation of counter-claims and narratives from gov-
ernment officials and other members of the community who both as-
sert the need for regulation and condemn the property owner's pre-
sent or proposed use of her land. Providing compensation to
property owners who consider themselves unfairly treated will not re-
solve the conflicts in competing vernacular accounts of unfairness.
Fairness, in either its doctrinal or vernacular form, has not provided,
and indeed may be unable to provide, a stable and coherent ap-
proach to takings.
B. Utilitarian Rationales
Utilitarian rationales for the Takings Clause consider how judicial
enforcement of the Fifth Amendment can produce the private prop-
erty regime that will best meet the proponent's stated or unstated
normative assumptions regarding how to maximize a society's
' See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 494-95, 500-01 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(distinguishing Dery and Kelo's well-maintained homes).
'w See id. at 473 (discussing economic conditions that prompted officials to explore an eco-
nomic revitalization project).
... See id. at 483-86 & n.16 (deferring to the city'sjudgment). Such opposing renditions of a
case's facts are fairly common in disputed takings decisions. See Alexander, supra note 131 (not-
ing the recurring narratives in Supreme Court opinions).
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wealth . Libertarian utilitarians view a compensation requirement
for regulation and limitations on eminent domain as means to limit
inefficient government interference in the optimal private ordering
of land use and ownership; 9 others utilize constitutional limits to
tease out optimal means to check, rather than debilitate, local gov-
ernment. 94 Whether deeply skeptical or agnostic about government's
role, however, all utilitarians view the Takings Clause as an instru-
ment of governance, a means by which the political decisions of regu-
lators and agencies that wield eminent domain authority can be ex-
ternally controlled by judicial review.
A common assumption among utilitarians who view the Takings
Clause as a significant tool for wealth creation holds that strong,
strictly enforced property rights both clarify and secure ownership
and the extent of property's allowed use, and thereby induce labor
and investment."115  Utilitarian rationales rely on political economic
theories of government behavior to identify the structural defects of
state decision-making and operations that cause ineffective regula-
tions and excessive exercises of eminent domain authority. Police
power authority, for example, provides government with strong in-
centives to avoid taking title to property and compensating the
owner. Because a government agency can thereby shift regulatory
costs onto property owners, a rational agency would never choose to
take land and incur the constitutionally-required payment of com-
pensation. Government experiences the "fiscal illusion" that its regu-
lations are inexpensive because property owners, rather than the
state, bear the regulatory costs.'96 Thus, government would always
choose to regulate rather than use its eminent domain power when it
'9 Bentham provides the classic utilitarian approach to property rights. See JEREMY
BENTHAM, Principles of the Civil Code, in THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 111-14 (C. K. Ogden ed.,
1931) (noting the inabsolute nature of property rights and the law's creation of such rights).
... See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules,
106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2094-96 (1997) (arguing that a stable property rights system that limits
those instances in which the state may take or regulate property to a small category will maxi-
mize wealth).
1, See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 139, at 1214-18 (explicating system by which a compensa-
tion requirement can best meet utilitarian ethics by identifying, calibrating, and offsetting effi-
ciency gains, demoralization costs, and settlement costs).
'95 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAw 32-34 (6th ed. 2003) ("[L]egal
protection of property rights creates incentives to exploit resources efficiently."); Garrett Har-
din, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243 (1968) (noting the evils of current property rights
while recognizing the lack of a better alternative); Emily Sherwin, Three Reasons Why Even Good
Property Rights Cause Moral Anxiety 4-5 (Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-001, 2006),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid-875634 (describing significant
social functions of property rights).
"' See Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis,
72 CAL. L. REV. 569, 620-22 (1984) (showing "fiscal illusion" where the governing body does
not directly experience a budgetary expense).
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can substitute regulation for outright takings, no matter if the taking
would result in a "better," more wealth maximizing outcome than the
regulation.'9' In order to act efficiently, the government agency must
fully internalize the costs of regulation through the "price" of com-
pensation paid to property owners. For utilitarians, the Fifth
Amendment's compensation requirement solves the fiscal illusion
problem by forcing government to consider fully the impact of its de-
cisions.198
Of course, merely finding a rationale for a compensation re-
quirement does not identify precisely when and to what extent the
requirement should be enforced against regulations. To address this
problem, utilitarian commentators have offered various tests to sniff
out inefficient government interventions into market activity with an
eye to imposing rules that would result in more effective and fairly
administered regulatory programs that better protect property rights
and encourage the best usage of land. 99
The same political economic dynamic that leads government to
over-regulate and that therefore requires a limiting constitutional
compensation requirement, utilitarians argue, also leads government
agencies to misuse or abuse their eminent domain authority and re-
quires analogous constitutional limits. If frustrated by economic de-
velopment within their jurisdiction or otherwise motivated to change
'9' This result would occur if the proposed regulatory scheme reduces private property values
by more than the public money saved from avoiding compensation. See William A. Fischel, Tak-
ings and Public Choice: The Persuasion of Price, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC CHOICE 549
(Charles K. Rowley & Friedrich Schneider eds., 2004) ("[E]xplain[ing] how the present distinc-
tion between physical takings and regulatory takings causes governments to choose too much
regulation.").
' See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 22 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (arguing that a compensation requirement forces government to internalize
the costs of its regulatory acts); EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 214-15, 263-73 ("[I] n most controver-
sial zoning cases it is improper to deny explicit compensation."); POSNER, supra note 195, at 58
(asserting a need for judicial supervision due to local government politics); William A. Fischel &
Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretations of "Just
Compensation" Law, 17J. LEGAL STUD. 269, 269-70 (1988) (analyzing the argument that com-
pensation provides an effective check on government takings).
,9 See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV.
531, 537-38, 606-08 (2005) (proposing an integrated theory of property based on the assertion
that law should create and defend the value of stable ownership in order to enable owners to
extract maximum utility from their possessions, and arguing that an "undue diminution of
value" test for regulatory takings would be consistent with their theory and further its goals);
Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 196, at 624 (advocating "risk-insurance approach to the taking
question" that can improve efficiency of the land market by compensating large risks of regula-
tion); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Regulatory Takings: When Should Compensation Be
Paid?, 23J. LEGAL STUD. 749, 750 (1994) (proposing ex ante and ex post tests to check if pre-
regulatory land use was efficient and if post-regulatory efficiency has been achieved); Michel-
man, supra note 139, at 1222-23 (proposing a rough formulation of when compensation should
be paid based upon benefits and costs of regulation, settlement costs, and demoralization
costs).
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existing patterns of land ownership and use, local officials can too
quickly and cheaply take land, and as a result will tend to do so exces-
sively and frequently for the benefit of favored or powerful interests.
Judicial enforcement of the "public use" and 'just compensation"
clauses can serve as external checks that force such takings to be pro-
ductive and wealth-enhancing. '  Strict limits on the public use of
land would limit the objectives of eminent domain actions to the
creation of public goods that are insufficiently supplied in the mar-
ketplace,0 1 or, in a less restrictive view, to instances in which the
benefits of the taking outweigh the costs. 2 0 2 In addition, a constitu-
tional requirement that would correctly calibrate the just compensa-
tion owed to property owners would force government to disgorge
excess gains from "naked transfers" of property from one party to an-
other, and to increase compensation to former owners for their loss
of implicit, in-kind benefits of the property they lose. A correctly
calibrated compensation scheme, therefore, would curb government
overreach while it would more fully compensate owners of taken
property.
For some utilitarians, these constitutional restrictions and their
enforcement must be quite strict. Those who find governmental
overreach abuse to be the norm-rather than the occasional, cor-
rectable result of structural defects in regulatory and taking author-
ity-view municipal efforts to control land use and ownership merely
as opportunities for self-interested officials and rent-seeking interest
2014groups to use regulatory authority for private gain. Democratic
politics provide neither sufficient internal constraints on the scope of
regulation and eminent domain actions nor external political con-
Merrill, supra note 7, at 82-87 (allotting the role of overseeing subjective losses in eminent
domain transactions to the courts).
See EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 166-69 (equating public use with the public goods theory).
See Michelman, supra note 139, at 1241 (naming certain investments that should not re-
quire compensation).
o See, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 154, at 28-33 (proposing that property owners
self-assess the value of their homes and the government can only take the property at that price,
but if the government decides not to take the property, the property cannot be sold for less
than the self-assessment for seventy years without payment of the shortfall to the government,
with the self-assessed price being factored into property tax liability as a result); James E. Krier
& Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 859, 865-73 (providing possible solu-
tions to the underestimations of a fair market compensation program). For more on the use of
compensation as a means to achieve substantive goals, see Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of
Value: AssessingJust Compensation for Regulatory Takings, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 677 (2005).
204 See EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 104 ("Where regulation of use and disposition is permitted as
a matter of course, then the individuals who control the levers of government power can get
what they want at reduced expenditure of their own wealth."); Ilya Somin, Overcoming Poletown:
County of Wayne v. Hathcock, Economic Development Takings, and the Future of Public Use, 2004
MICH. ST. L. REv. 1005, 1021-23 (2004) (describing the seemingly unchecked influence of pri-
vate interest groups over public officials).
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straints on elected leaders. As a result, land use controls create op-
portunities for significant corruption and abuse.2 0°5 From this per-
spective, even correctly calibrated compensation cannot curb both
the authority of government agencies to take land on behalf of a fa-
vored interest and the willingness and ability of favored interests and
officials to utilize that authority.20 6 Only a vigorously enforced public
use clause that would invalidate any taking that did not result in pub-
licly accessible land can serve as an effective external check on abuse
of government authority.27  Similarly, because regulation serves
merely as a means by which rent-seeking private interests and self-
motivated officials feather their own nests, the judiciary must apply
the regulatory takings doctrine broadly and enforce it strictly as an
external check on inevitable government overreach.08
The Court's takings decisions have not entirely ignored utilitarian
and public choice considerations and skepticism about the wealth-
enhancing effects of government action. Justice Holmes began the
modern era of regulatory takings by expressing the intuitive public
choice notion that "the natural tendency of human nature" is to ex-
tend collective authority; a constitutional check on regulations that
extends "too far," therefore, operates to preserve the right of private
property and all of its attendant benefits.w In a more recent deci-
sion, Justice Scalia similarly hypothesized that, absent a constitutional
limit, government agencies would leverage their police powers to
achieve unstated, unrelated, and even illegitimate goals through
regulation. This would lead, presumably, to excessive regulation that
fails to perform the regulatory purpose of reducing the harms cre-
ated by a proposed land use.
2 10
But Justice Holmes's intuitive version of public choice theory does
not represent either a necessary constitutional logic or a norm of ju-
dicial reasoning, as the Court has in fact rarely cited utilitarian con-
cerns as a significant ground for enforcing constitutional property
" See Somin, supra note 204, at 1011-16 (noting the average voter's ignorance of the corrup-
tion and the subsequent lack of accountability of public officials).
" See Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings after Kelo, at
32-36 (George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 06-01, 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstracticid=874865 (illustrating the ill effects on the
private property owner as well as the tax-paying populace).
7 See id. at 5-7 (suggesting a possible trend in limiting the government's eminent domain
powers).
m See EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 100-04 (noting that various "forms of regulation ... amount
to partial takings").
m Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
"0 See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 n.5 (1987) (establishing the "essen-
tial nexus" test for conditions placed on development in part because, absent a constitutional
limit, government agencies might leverage their police power to achieve goals that are unre-
lated to legitimate land use-purposes).
[Vol. 9:3
THE TAKINGS CLA USE
rights protections. Indeed, when the Court has considered the con-
sequences of a compensation requirement on a regulation or of a
substantive limit on an eminent domain action, it has frequently de-
cided that Takings Clause enforcement is unrelated to, or even op-
posed to, an optimal utilitarian end. Thus, in recent years the Court
has held that some regulatory activity and economic development
projects can be wealth-enhancing and necessary for the management
of scarce resources-while at the same time curbing regulatory and
taking authority through constitutional enforcement would limit the
state's ability to help increase societal wealth.1  The Court has hy-
pothesized that stricter enforcement of the Takings Clause may skew
governmental actions and produce suboptimal results by creating in-
centives for agencies to make decisions to avoid judicial scrutiny
rather than basing decisions on the wisest course of action available
to them. 12 In other words, the Court has decided that judicial con-
ceptions of a utilitarian purpose in land-use controls are irrelevant,
21 On the potential wealth-enhancing effects of economic development takings, see Kelo v.
City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 479 nn.7-8 (2005). On the wealth-enhancing effects of
land-use regulations, see Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 339-41 (2002), which characterizes a deliberative, careful approach to regional plan-
ning that imposes a temporary moratorium on development during the planning process as an
important means to avoid "inefficient and ill-conceived growth" and a likely way to increase
property values throughout the affected region. The state frequently must step in to manage
the use of scarce public goods such as clean air, water, park space, and road capacity where the
existing distribution of entitlements to use those resources block beneficial contractual ar-
rangements. See GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 115-21 (1989) (under-
standing that property rights that are devised to reduce wastes also define a distribution of
wealth and political power). There is a significant body of literature on the necessity of land-use
regulations to respond to resource depletion and congestion and on the need to limit a com-
pensation requirement to allow government to shape market activity to manage transitions. See
Poirier, supra note 6, at 179-83 (arguing that shifts in property rights are caused by a whole host
of factors, including resource management); Carol M. Rose, Property and Expropriation: Themes
and Variations in American Law, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 1, 18 (2000) (noting the need for curbing
individual property rights in order to avoid the negative cumulative effects on a limited re-
source supply). In addition, land-use regulation has proven to have both wealth-enhancing ef-
fects and popularity among rational homeowners who believe, correctly, that land-use controls
often raise and protect property values. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS:
How HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-
USE POLICIES 51-52 (2001) (analogizing homeowners and stockholders); McUsic, supra note 5,
at 625 n.162 (explaining some of the positive effects of zoning laws on property value).
21 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488-89 (creating potentially significant impediments to the successful
completion of development plans); Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 335 (rejecting a rule that would
compensate for every delay because it would "encourage hasty decisionmaking"); see also Fen-
ster, supra note 137, at 652-58 (identifying the range of consequences, most of them unin-
tended and suboptimal, stemming from the Court's efforts to increase scrutiny of land-use exac-
tions); Krier & Serkin, supra note 203, at 864-65 (noting the problems that would likely arise
from greater scrutiny of eminent domain actions under Public Use Clause); Michael H. Schill,
Regulations and Housing Development: What We Know, 8 CITYSCAPE 5, 6-8 (2005) (cautioning that
efforts to remove land-use regulation find it difficult to distinguish "bad" from "good" regula-
tions).
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except where the judiciary is considering the costs of heightened
scrutiny to its own administrative utility;213 the wisest, most utilitarian
course of judicial action is to defer to governmental conclusions re-
garding the utilitarian value of its own regulatory or eminent domain
actions.
It is unclear why the Court has largely eschewed the legal acad-
emy's fascination with, and development of, a utilitarian analysis of
the Takings Clause. The Court may have determined that a utilitar-
ian approach is too indeterminate to adopt, given the persuasive ar-
guments that can be harnessed on behalf of and against the utility of
government interventions into market activity."4 A court could follow
Richard Epstein and conclude that only an expansive regulatory tak-
ings doctrine and a narrow Public Use Clause can adequately maxi-
mize wealth; or it could follow Carol Rose and conclude that the best
wealth-maximizing approach to takings would be to form a doctrinal
compromise in which regulation proceeds flexibly and cautiously,
and only those whose investment-backed expectations are severely
frustrated receive compensation;215 or it could recognize that any ef-
fort to maximize the utility of constitutional limits on land-use con-
trols requires a multi-dimensional analysis that considers an almost
unlimited range of concerns, from "takings" to "givings," to the ef-
fects of compensation requirements and a rigorous Public Use Clause
analysis on the public and on indirectly affected property owners.
2 16
21 The Court has cited the potentially catastrophic transactional costs associated with resolv-
ing or settling regulatory takings claims, as well as the decisional costs to the judiciary of admin-
istering stricter limits on the Public Use Clause. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480 (expressing concern
about the difficulty of applying heightened judicial review under the Public Use Clause); Tahoe-
Sierra, 535 U.S. at 335 (rejecting a rule that would compensate for every delay because it "would
render routine government processes prohibitively expensive").
114 See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 134 (2004) (noting
economic arguments both for and against providing compensation for regulatory takings);
DANA & MERRILL, supra note 2, at 27-32 (noting utilitarian arguments in favor of eminent do-
main authority, as well as reasons for limiting that authority).
215 See Rose, supra note 211, at 19-21 ("What the courts seek is a signal that a particular prop-
erty owner ... has sunk capital on the basis of a previous regulatory regime.").
216 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE LJ. 547, 550-51 (2001)
(identifying "givings," in which a government promulgates a regulation that grants benefits to,
rather than confiscates the property of, an identifiable individual or individuals); Abraham Bell
& Gideon Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, .87 VA. L. REv. 277, 280-81 (2001) (identifying the
"derivative taking" that results from the reduction in the value of property near a parcel that is
taken by regulation or eminent domain); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Uselessness
of Public Use, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1412, 1426-40 (2006) (arguing that a more rigorous public-use
doctrine would not help property owners or ban inefficient eminent domain actions because
government can use other powers to achieve the same goals); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of
the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARv. L. REV. 621, 687-88
(1998) (identifying the underutilization by the public of rare and valuable resources due to ex-
cessive constitutional rights that over-protect property); Christopher Serkin, Big Differences for
Small Governments: Local Governments and the Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1624, 1666-79
(2006) (arguing that takings compensation does not necessarily force cost internalization and
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Neither text nor history nor precedent dictates a choice between
those options. Perhaps, too, the Court has recognized the validity of
critiques of utilitarian approaches, 7 or the inadequately theorized
concepts on which utilitarians rely to promote vigorous takings en-
forcement, such as the fiscal illusion of regulation and the cost inter-
nalization effect of compensation requirements. 2 1 8  It is also possible
that the utilitarian approach is not as distinct from others as it might
superficially appear, and that an approach emphasizing fairness and
one that emphasizes a utilitarian ethic will frequently turn on similar
considerations and measures, as Frank Michelman argued more than
a generation ago.219 Viewed this way, the Court has not rejected utili-
tarianism but merely incorporated its insights within other rationales.
But significantly, the court did not rely upon a utilitarian rationale as
a basis for its 2005 decisions.
C. Private Property as an Institution
A final general justification for enforcement of the Takings Clause
holds that constitutional compensation and public use requirements
are necessary to protect property rights as an essential institution for
the maintenance of natural law and of social order and community.
Since its earliest modern occurrence in Mahon, for example, the
Court's regulatory takings doctrine has frequently warned that, if the
state is allowed to extend its police powers too far, use of these pow-
efficiency because local governments tend to be risk averse, and their decisions create external-
ities on others).
"' For example, a moral hazard problem would arise from an expanded compensation re-
quirement, which will encourage owners to overdevelop and over-invest in their property with
the knowledge that any regulatory act that addresses an owner's use of her land will be compen-
sated. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 614-17
(1986) (discussing incentives issues resulting from expectations of future government action).
Commentators have in turn attempted to devise complicated solutions to this moral hazard. See
Abraham Bell, Not Just Compensation, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 29, 48 (2003) (proposing a
compensation scheme that would bar recovery for a property owner's reckless overdevelop-
ment); Lawrence Blume, Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Perry Shapiro, The Taking of Land: When Should
Compensation Be Paid?, 99 Q.J. ECON. 71, 88 (1984) (proposing that compensation only be paid
for amount approximating full value of property without overdevelopment).
"' See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 345, 387 (2000) (arguing that cost internalization theory
of compensation requirement fails because the incentive effects of constitutional cost remedies
are "simply indeterminate" and are likely to be as perverse as beneficial); Barton H. Thompson,
Jr., Conservation Options: Toward a Greater Public Role, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 245, 289 (2002) (sum-
marizing empirical evidence and theoretical arguments against assumptions embedded in fiscal
illusion concept).
219 See Michelman, supra note 139, at 1225-26 (suggesting that the utilitarian approach might
not be so different after all).
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ers will expand "until at last private property disappears."2 0 Thisjusti-
fication is not primarily utilitarian insofar as it posits that property's
institutional value transcends any particular wealth-enhancing effects;
nor is it primarily intended to remedy any particularized unfairness
to an individual owner. Rather, this rationale, which includes quite
distinct approaches, views the institution of private property as hold-
ing significant value for human dignity and the creation of a good so-
ciety.
1. Property as Natural Right/Takings Clause as Protective Shield
Natural law (or natural rights) proponents argue that property
serves as a pre-legal and pre-political right that remains inherent in
personhood under civil society's social compact between the individ-
221ual and the state. Whether viewed as flowing from a Creator or as
developed in human experience and through common law rights,
the institution of private property protects from coercive state action
the things over which an individual claims dominion and for which
she expended her labor. Thus, natural rights proponents argue, in
order to protect private property from the inevitable vulnerability
that comes with government authority to redistribute entitlements,
courts must interpret the Takings Clause strictly and enforce it
broadly.22 Specifically, courts must award compensation to property
,20 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). A taking of particularly important
strands of the bundle of property rights also requires compensation under the same logic be-
cause to allow otherwise would challenge an essential historical institution. See, e.g., Hodel v.
Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987) (holding that the right to pass valuable property to one's heirs
is an essential right of property).
' See EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 9-10 (discussing Locke's view of inherent property rights in
response to Hobbes); Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88
CORNELL L. REv. 1549, 1566-68 (2003) (suggesting that property rights may emanate from
sources outside of politics and the law).
See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Public-Use Limitations and Natural Property Rights, 2004 MICH. ST. L.
REv. 877, 892-901 (2004) [hereinafter Claeys, Public-Use Limitations] (arguing that the narrow
"public use" limitation for eminent domain actions was an essential assumption of natural rights
theory's conception of property); Richard A. Epstein, Ruminations on Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council: An Introduction to Amics Curiae Brief 25 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1225, 1241 (1992)
[hereinafter Epstein, Ruminations] (defining ownership as "a set of complete and well defined
rights over the property," and arguing that any deprivation of "one of the indispensable attrib-
utes of ownership" requires compensation); Douglas W. Kmiec, Inserting the Last Remaining Pieces
into the Takings Puzzle, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 995, 995-96 (1997) (condemning the "'ad
hockly'-edged [sic]" Penn Central for an "overly deferential standard of review" and "virtually
insurmountable presumption of constitutionality" that is "against a presumption against free-
dom of ownership") [hereinafter Kmiec, Inserting the Last Remaining Pieces]; cf Ellen Frankel
Paul, Moral Restraints and Eminent Domain, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 152, 153 (1986) (reviewing
EPSTEIN, supra note 5) (rejecting eminent domain, "however circumscribed," as a legitimate
form of state power because of its threat to private property rights).
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owners for the regulatory prohibition of non-nuisance harms,23 while
courts must interpret government's authority to take under the Pub-
lic Use Clause narrowly and invalidate all eminent domain actions
whose end result will be a private use of the taken land except in nar-
row, historically recognized categories.224 And in order to secure a
natural rights conception of private property, courts must adopt sta-
ble, precise, and self-enforcing rules.2
But as Carol Rose has noted, natural law conceptions of a pre-
political basis for property rights have never had more than a "frail"
hold on takings jurisprudence.2 2 ' The Court has occasionally feinted
in the direction of natural rights in its decisions establishing per se
categories of takings, boldly pronouncing that compensation is re-
quired for a particular type of regulatory effect or for the taking of a
particularly significant stick in the bundle of property rights.227 But to
understand property rights as a bundle rather than as a coherent
whole, and to reward some regulatory effects with compensation
while failing to guard against other significant effects by establishing
rule-bound, formal protection, is to adopt something that falls sig-
2 See EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 57-92, 112-21 ("The coverage of the clause.., is not dimin-
ished or eliminated even though.., the taking (including property destruction) is smaller in
size, and.., the range and frequency of persons subject to the taking are simultaneously in-
creased."); Kmiec, Inserting the Last Remaining Pieces, supra note 222, at 1044-46 (1997) (con-
cluding that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment should afford property owners protec-
tion from the regulatory prohibition of non-nuisance harms).
2" See Claeys, Public-Use Limitations, supra note 222, at 928 (arguing that a natural-rights ap-
proach should be adopted to determine when the government can take a property interest
from one private owner and give it to another private party).
n5 See McUsic, supra note 5, at 660-61 (associating natural rights approach with rule formal-
ism). Not all natural rights proponents are equally rule-bound and formalistic, however. Com-
pare EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 36 (positing a "simple test" for compensation: "Would the govern-
ment action be treated as a taking of private property if it had been performed by some private party "), with
Douglas W. Kmeic, The Original Understanding of the Traking Clause Is Neither Weak Nor Obtuse, 88
COLUM. L. REv. 1630, 1665-66 (1988) (arguing in favor of a "delicate and dynamic balance"
between individual rights and majoritarian governance that restores a strong nuisance limita-
tion on regulations and broadens government liability for compensation).
M' See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L.
REV. 561, 595 (1984) (noting that natural law probably does not form a strong pre-political basis
property rights).
27 See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992) ("[T]otal deprivation
of beneficial use is, from the landowner's point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropria-
tion"); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716-17 (1987) (noting that the right to devise property to
one's heirs "has been part of the Anglo-American legal system since feudal times" and a total
abrogation of that right requires compensation); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982) (holding that because it abrogates the right to exclude, a
permanent physical invasion necessarily effects a taking "without regard to whether the action
achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner");
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (stating that the right to exclude is "one
of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property"
and a regulation that imposes a navigational servitude on a marina owner thereby destroys the
right to exclude and requires compensation).
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nificantly short of a natural-law approach.22s The unanimous reitera-
tion of this approach in Lingle further demonstrated that the Court
has rejected a unitary, natural law theory of property in favor of a
theory of property as a disentangled bunch of severable rights. This
is not natural law, and natural rights proponents are the first to admit
that even at the heights of the Rehnquist Court's apparent expansion
229of regulatory takings, the Supreme Court did not adopt their view.
Indeed, Justice Thomas's dissent in Kelo, which expressly adopted a
natural law approach to property, failed to garner the vote of a single
additional Justice. 2"' And although Justice O'Connor included in her
Kelo dissent an ironic reversal of Marx's opening to The Communist
Manifesto--warning that "[t]he specter of condemnation hangs over
all property" as a result of the majority's decision23l-she would allow
232
a much broader array of takings than Justice Thomas.
This may well be the fault of the theory, not the Court. Any effort
to limit non-compensable takings to the regulation of nuisance-like
harms must not only rely upon a significantly heightened judicial
scrutiny of regulatory and takings decisions, it must also confront the
difficult line-drawing issue created b the need to identify the
boundaries of nuisance and public use. 3 The natural rights advocate
must assert that some line-drawing principle emerges from the Con-
stitution itself-a principle so clear and strong that it trumps states'
authority to utilize their police powers and to define the limits of
property rights within their jurisdiction.2 4 In Lucas, Justice Scalia
himself conceded the impossibility of engaging in a principled line-
drawing exercise between regulations that prevent harm, and thus do
not require compensation, and those that confer benefits on others,
228 See EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 20-26 (criticizing Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Prop-
erty, in XXII NOMOS: PROPERTY 69 U. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980)).
See Claeys, Takings and Private Property on the Rehnquist Court, supra note 30, at 188 (discuss-
ing what the Rehnquist court has been willing to do with Takings Clause doctrine); Richard A.
Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV.
1369, 1392 (1993) (noting that the Court has failed to allow a natural law theory to create sev-
erable property fights).
See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 510 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The
Public Use Clause, in short, embodied the Framers' understanding that property is a natural,
fundamental right....").
"' Id. at 503 (O'Connor,J., dissenting).
232 See id. at 500 (reaffirming, though limiting, Berman and MidkifJ).
253 See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Responsibility, Causation, and the Harm-Benefit Line in Takings Juris-
prudence, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 433, 435 (1995) (discussing the need to distinguish between
those government actions that prevent a harm and those that create a benefit in order to de-
termine which government actions require compensation); Stewart Sterk, The Inevitable Failure of
Nuisance-Based Theories of the Takings Clause: A Reply to Professor Claeys, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 231,
235-36 (2004) (introducing the theory of originalism and explaining how it may help deter-
mine whether a regulation is harm preventing).
2M See Sterk, supra note 233, at 236-39 (noting the hurdles that a natural fights advocate
must jump).
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which do.235 Once one recognizes the difficulty of line-drawing,
property's occasional tendency towards crystalline rules236 becomes
impossible to extend fully to the Takings Clause-whose enforce-
ment, if considered as a means to limit non-nuisance based regula-
tion, would inevitably require courts to make difficult judgments re-
garding contested land uses on the basis of conditions and norms
that change across time and space.237
2. Property as Social and Political Institution/Takings Clause as Mediating
Device
An approach that emphasizes property's social nature and collec-
tive values foregrounds the relationships that ownership creates and
expresses. This approach emphasizes the sense of responsibility and
obligations an owner has to others and to the property she owns, as
well as the mutual trust that a property regime is intended to foster
among members of society.238  In addition to defining the terms of
ownership and use, the rules of property law establish both the indi-
vidual's place in society and her obligations "to respect the legitimate
interests of others in controlling certain portions of the physical
world. 2 39  Property serves, ultimately, as a foundation of decency,
propriety, and good order. Accordingly, a constitutional property
right must operate reciprocally both to protect an individual's owner-
ship entitlements and to redistribute those entitlements when pro-
priety or the community requires it.2
4 °
SeeLucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1025-26 (1992).
2 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 9-24 (2000) (suggesting that the different property
interests are largely fixed); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577,
578-80 (1988) (explaining that exceptions to clear rules have evolved over time and have led to
confusion in the common law); Emily Sherwin, Two- and Three-Dimensional Property Rights, 29
ARIz. ST. L.J. 1075, 1086-88 (1997) (concluding that property rights are determined by rules
rather than shifting standards). Even crystalline rules and institutions of ownership (such as the
fee simple, common ownership, publicly held corporations, and the like) change over time. See
Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1517, 1558-65 (2003) (utilizing a "property
as institutions" framework).
237 See Sherwin, supra note 195, at 6-9 (stating that determinacy is a defining characteristic of
a property right).
' See Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Rights as Relationship, 1 REV. CONST. STUDIES 1, 13
(1993) (discussing the effect property law has on society and politics).
JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 134 (2000).
4 See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY
IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776-1970, at 1-2 (1997) (claiming that property should not
only be viewed as a means to satisfy individual agendas but should also be viewed as a means to
establish and maintain public good); Carol M. Rose, Property as Wealth, Property as Propriety, 33
NoMOS 223, 239-40 (1994) (noting that many balance an individual's loss from an uncompen-
sated redistribution against the public's benefit in order to determine whether the taking was
just);Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 150 (1971) (stat-
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According to Joseph Singer, the Court has adopted at least a ver-
sion of this approach in its 2005 takings decisions. 4' The Court, he
argues, enforces constitutional rights by balancing a property-rule
right that views ownership as paramount and the home as a "castle,"
against a liability-rule right in which ownership entitles an individual
only to full compensation for her investment-backed expectations
when the government takes her property for public needs.242 This
balance produces a "citizenship model" of property rights in which
owners' rights to use, protect, and profit from their home are limited
by their obligations, for the good of the community to which they be-
long, both to restrain themselves and, at times, to act affirmatively. 4 '
Thus, the map of regulatory takings claims that Lingle set out recog-
nizes property as a "castle" when it is besieged by extreme regulatory
effects, but otherwise subjects owners' expectations "to the crucible of
human judgment to determine their reasonableness. 2"
This social view of property embraces precisely what natural law
proponents fear as an excess of state intervention into the inherent
rights of ownership-the political, community-based nature of deci-
sions over how land is to be used. In this view, the social and political
processes by which regulations are formulated and enacted are op-
portunities for successful dispute resolution and education about the
advantages of self-government and the need to be sociable-rather
than an inevitable legal catastrophe in which rights are ignored and
trampled.2 5  Insofar as the Takings Clause largely defers to the local
political process but requires compensation or invalidates eminent
domain actions when property rights are especially diminished or in-
dividuals are explicitly singled out, it functions both to protect and
mediate. It encourages, if not forces, property owners to work with
their neighbors, safe with the knowledge that a baseline of constitu-
ing that separate and distinct property rights come together to form an interdependent net-
work).
241 Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society & Regulatory Takings: Castles, Investments, &
Just Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVrrL. L. REv. 309 (2006).
242 Id. at 325-28.
2" Id. at 328-33.
2 Id. at 328; see also Poirier, supra note 6, at 150-83 (submitting that the "muddy rules" of
property law and takings doctrine lead to negotiation among community members and, ulti-
mately, stronger ties to community); Margaret Jane Radin, Diagnosing the Takings Problem, 33
NOMOS 248, 269-70 (1991) (concluding that contested liberal legal and political concepts and
the need for pragmatic, situated judgments makes takings jurisprudence resistant to clear
rules).
245 See Fenster, supra note 137, at 668-78 (arguing that the Court's use of precise rules to
limit government regulations has resulted in undesirable consequences); Carol M. Rose, New
Models for Local Land Use Decisions, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1155, 1170 (1985) (noting that community
standards are important for deals involving land use); Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone
Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 329, 363-65 (1996) (stating that people maximize wealth de-
rived from property when they cooperate, and hence they must also learn to self-govern).
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tional protection will be extended when their efforts result in the in-
valid or uncompensated expropriation of their property.
Without going so far as expressly adopting an educational or me-
diatory rationale for its decision in Lingle, the Court characterized its
takings jurisprudence as an effort to balance concern for the individ-
ual with deference to the community and democratic will. Although
Lingle's "functional equivalence" doctrine identifies those regulatory
instances that are "so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct
appropriation or ouster" and thus require compensation, 46 the de-
termination of when a regulation is equivalent to appropriation or
ouster requires a court to "remain cognizant" of the government's au-
thority to "adjust[] ... rights for the public good," and consequently
of the impossible burden government would face if it must pay com-
pensation for every change in its laws.247 Thus, the categories of per
se takings relieve the "unique burden" they impose due to their
equivalence with appropriation and ouster, while the Penn Central de-
fault test balances fairness concerns with the need to defer to gov-
ernment attempts to promote the public good. 248 Kelo operates simi-
larly, although the majority decision seemed less concerned about
unfairness to the individual's loss of their property and any potential
shortfalls in compensation.
In this sense, the Court has implicitly, although not as explicitly as
Singer appears to claim, adopted a conception of property rights as
both an individual right and as an institution within which those
rights are balanced against the community's needs, and of the Tak-
ings Clause as a means by which courts mediate this balance. Of the
rationales I have reviewed in this Part, this conception of the Court's
reasons for its 2005 decisions seems best able to capture at least parts
of the decisions' substantive purpose. In Part III, I begin to identify
the Court's more explicit institutional rationales in its federalist ten-
dencies before arguing ultimately that legal process and institutional
settlement in fact serve as the approach underlying the Court's 2005
decisions.
III. THE INCOMPLETE EXPLANATION OF FEDERALIST DEFERENCE
At stake in most, although not all, takings decisions is how the
Federal Constitution's Fifth Amendment applies to the actions of
state and local governments. A number of scholars have persuasively
asserted that federalist concerns for state law's supremacy over prop-
146 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005).
27 Id. at 538 (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979), and citing Pa. Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)).
21 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538-39.
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erty law and state and local governments' authority to oversee land
use in their jurisdictions either explain or should play a larger role in
the Court's takings jurisprudence. 4 9  These arguments assert the fol-
lowing: States, and not the Federal Constitution, generally define
property and the rights that attach to it;2 5° states, by statute or consti-
tution, authorize local governmental authority to regulate and take
property, and can thereby limit that authority;251 state constitutions
include or have been read to include takings provisions, and state
courts are perfectly capable of enforcing both those provisions and, if
need be, federal ones; 52 and state legislatures have filled any per-
ceived gaps and shortcomings in federal and state constitutional
compensations requirements by imposing legislative requirements.
In light of these structural and institutional commitments, states and
their subordinate agencies are, or should be, granted the autonomy
249 See Melvyn R. Durchslag, Forgotten Federalism: The Takings Clause and Local Land Use Deci-
sions, 59 MD. L. REV. 464, 490-93 (2000) (discussing the adverse effects of the Court's current
takings jurisprudence on federalism and individual liberties); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Fed-
eralism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas and Judicial Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV.
301, 327 (1993) (criticizing the Court's federalizing of local land-use law by imposing precise
rules on states under the Takings Clause); Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory
Takings Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L.J. 203, 270-71 (2004) (observing that the Court's takings juris-
prudence partially dictates local property laws, hence it appears to conflict with federalism).
2W See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (stating that the Constitution does
not create property interests but other independent sources, such as state laws, do); T.V.A. v.
Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 279 (1943) (noting that even though the meaning of "property" in the
Constitution is federally defined, the Court usually refers to local law); Abraham Bell & Gideon
Parchomovsky, Of Property and Federalism, 115 YALE L.J. 72, 74-76 (2005) (noting property laws
are in the states' domain and allow for variations over time and competition among states for
landowners); Durchslag, supra note 249, at 494 (noting that state law, not the Constitution, cre-
ates and defines property interests). One could argue, with Richard Epstein on the right and
Frank Michelman on the left, that if states were the sole authority in the recognition of property
rights, then they could simply define property narrowly in order to preclude a "taking," and
thereby render the Fifth Amendment's protection meaningless. See Richard Epstein, Takings,
Exclusivity and Speech: The Legacy of Pruneyard v. Robins, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 25-27 (1997)
(arguing that the common law, i.e. the natural law, guards against the states' redefinition and
destruction of property rights); Frank Michelman, The Common Law Baseline and Restitution for
the Lost Commons: A Reply to Professor Epstein, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 57-58 (1997) (arguing that
Professor Epstein's use of common law as the baseline for property law is an unworkable princi-
ple). However, as Stewart Sterk argues, for historical and textual reasons, there is no reason to
think the Constitution itself confers any foundation for developing a federal property law. See
Sterk, supra note 249, at 224-25.
2" See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 1.01 (5th ed. 2003) (stating that state statutes
or constitutions authorize local authorities to enact zoning ordinances).
252 See Kathryn E. Kovacs, Accepting the Relegation of Takings Claims to State Courts: The Federal
Courts' Misguided Attempts to Avoid Preclusion UnderWilliamson County, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 34-36
(1999) (discussing four reasons to "accept[] the relegation of takings claims to state courts");
Sterk, supra note 249, at 261-62 (arguing that state courts are better fora than federal courts for
resolving takings issues).
2'5 See Mark W. Cordes, Leapfrogging the Constitution: The Rise of State Takings Legislation, 24
ECOLOGY L.Q. 187, 190 (1997) (explaining that state legislations have clarified ambiguities in
judicial decisions).
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to regulate land use and ownership within their jurisdictions and
without overly intrusive federal constitutional rules imposed upon
them by the U.S. Supreme Court and enforced by the federal judici-
254
ary.
Federalism proponents offer consequentialist claims as well as
structural ones, arguing that deference to state law and state courts
provides significant beneficial consequences. State courts and legisla-
tures are better situated than the Supreme Court to devise either op-
timal takings rules that could apply in multiple states, or rules that
are narrowly tailored to a state's specific needs or legal culture.2 5
The complex nature and wide variance of state property law advises
against Supreme Court efforts to impose significant, complicated tak-
ings rules that would provide little guidance to state courts and legis-
latures and local regulators, and that would lead ultimately to uneven
enforcement by state and lower federal courts.256 Deference to lower
levels of government also enables state and local jurisdictions to
compete for potential residents with differentiated package of public
goods, tax rates, and regulatory regimes; individuals can then simu-
late shoppers in their decisions about where to live to find jurisdic-
tions that offer the most attractive packages of public goods ameni-
ties, property values, and taxes, and can thereby reward or punish
local governments based on their effectiveness. Localism itself in-
stills important virtues and offers significant advantages-by educat-
ing the public in self-governance within a small-sized, accessible, and
responsive state, and by providing another level in addition to states
where innovation and experimentation can take place. 5  So long as
some minimal legal checks are available to require bad-acting local
2 In this sense, the "federalism" at stake in the constitutional protection of property rights is
one based upon state autonomy from federal interference, rather than what Ernest Young has
characterized as federalism-based "sovereignty" doctrines that bar states from being held ac-
countable for their violations of federal norms. Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Fed-
eralisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004).
2 This may be especially true of state courts, which are freer to depart from the limiting
rules on judicial power that emanate from Article III's justiciability doctrine. See Helen
Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV.
1833, 1836-40 (2001) (noting ways in which the functions of the state courts differ from those
of the federal courts).
25 See Sterk, supra note 249, at 226-37 (arguing that the Supreme Court should avoid estab-
lishing confusing takings rules).
2'7 See FISCHEL, supra note 211, at 58-71 (summarizing and extending the theory of competi-
tive localism in Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956), and the literature that has developed from it); Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land
Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 527-28
(1991) (noting that states compete for residents based on the quality of public service and the
tax packages that they offer).
2M I develop these arguments further in Mark Fenster, Regulating Land Use in a Constitutional
Shadow: The Institutional Contexts of Exactions, 58 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2007) (on file with
author).
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governments to compensate victims of unfairly outlying regulation,
then the market, the responsive local government, and the innovative
small-scale pattern of governance that develops through competitive
localism will be more beneficial to property owners than rigorous
federal constitutional protections.259 Federalism therefore appears to
be a persuasive explanation of the Court's takings jurisprudence-
and, indeed, two of the 2005 decisions explicitly noted its influence
in their outcomes. The Kelo majority characterized early-twentieth-
century precedent on public use as having "embodied a strong theme
of federalism" in its respect for the decisions of state legislatures, and
implied that this principle supported its decision. 260 The Court in San
Remo suggested that its decision not to except takings decisions from
the Full Faith and Credit Act relied in part on its "weighty" interest in
demonstrating comity towards state court judgments, as well as on
state courts' experience "in resolving the complex factual, technical,
and legal questions related to zoning and land-use regulations.
2
'
61
But notwithstanding occasional language to support it, federalism
appears either to be a secondary rationale or a post hoc explanation
for takings decisions. When the Court relies upon federalism at all-
which it did not do in Lingle's unanimous explanation of its regula-
tory takings doctrine-it typically raises it as one among a series of ra-
tionales.2 6  Perhaps most significantly, the conservative Justices who
have expressed and voted more regularly for limiting the application
of federal constitutional rights to the states, at least with respect to
See FISCHEL, supra note 211, at 272-75, 283-85 (arguing that states should compensate
landowners when zoning regulations reduce their property value, although these regulations
are not physical takings); Fenster, supra note 258 (arguing that confining property law to the
local level provides benefits that federally-derived property law cannot); cf. George Wyeth, Regu-
latoy Competition and the Takings Clause, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 87, 105-06 (1996) (proposing regula-
tory takings approach that would require compensation when a state fails to behave as it would
in a competitive market by taking advantage of property owners and failing to balance the in-
terests of all citizens equitably).
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 482-83 (2005). The majority also encouraged
property owners to seek more stringent judicial review of economic development takings under
state law from their state courts and legislatures. See id. at 489-90; see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres.
Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 304, 342 (2002) (noting the significant,
suitable" role of state legislatures in engaging in land-use regulation such as temporary plan-
ning moratoria). See generally David L. Callies, Kelo v. City of New London: Of Planning, Federal-
ism, and a Switch in Time, 28 U. HAW. L. REV. 327 (2006) (summarizing the federalist case for
Kelo and for modern Public Use Clause caselaw).
San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 345, 347 (2005); see also
Stewart E. Sterk, The Demise of Federal Takings Litigation, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 251, 292-300
(2006) (explaining San Remo and Williamson County as decisions affirming a federalist deferral to
litigation of takings claims in state court).
M See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477-83 (identifying "a strong theme of federalism" in the Court's pub-
lic use precedents only after it stated that the "public purpose" rule, the weight of precedent, the
need for judicial restraint, and the difficulty of setting judicial standards to police a more strin-
gent public-use test required upholding the challenged taking under the Public Use Clause).
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263
state immunity from federal statutory claims, are those who have
been most vocally opposed to the Court's approach to the Takings
Clause . 264 At the same time, the Justices who have opposed the
Court's expansion of federalism in its state sovereign immunity deci-
sions have also cited federalist principles and the need to defer to
265s
state judgments and legislatures in takings cases. Even granting the
sincerity of conservative Justices' commitment to a natural, pre-
political right in property, and of liberal Justices' commitment to the
sovereignty of state governments, one cannot help but conclude that
their respective positions in takings cases represent a strategic ap-
proach to federalism that defers to state authority only to the extent
that such deference creates a result that is consistent with other,
competing concerns.266
Second, if federalism were in fact the central rationale for takings
law then one would anticipate different results when the federal gov-
ernment, rather than a state or local government, is the defendant,
or when federal definitions of property rights are under review. This
has not been the case. In United States v. Sperry,267 for example, the
Supreme Court applied the same constitutional tests to a regulatory
M' See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001) (holding that
under the Eleventh Amendment, the doctrine of state sovereign immunity bars suits by state
employees for money damages against a state employer tinder the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000) (holding that the doctrine of
state sovereign immunity bars private damage suits brought under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (holding
that Congress, acting pursuant to its Article I powers, may not abrogate states' immunity from
private damage suits).
See, e.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. at 504 (O'Connor,J, dissenting) (characterizing majority's deferral
to state legislatures for property rights protection a "refusal to enforce properly the Federal
Constitution" and "an abdication of our responsibility"); San Remo, 545 U.S. at 349-50
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (questioning whether any "federalism-based concerns" and "com-
ity" require takings plaintiffs to exhaust all of the judicial remedies offered by the state before
proceeding to federal court). See generally Michelman, supra note 249, at 311-14 (explaining
thatJustice Scalia's decision in Lucas gives no deference to state court determinations of its own
common law); Young, supra note 254, at 6-7 (identifying Justices who tend to favor limits on
federal power, three of whom-Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas-vote
consistently in favor of expanding federal constitutional property rights protections against the
police powers and taking authority of state and local governments).
M See supra notes 260-61 (citing Kelo, San Remo, and Tahoe-Sierra, three majority opinions
authored by Justice Stevens that rested in part on federalism grounds); Young, supra note 254,
at 41-44 (identifying Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer and Ginsburg, all of whom tend to vote
against expanded federal constitutional protections for property rights, as holding a commit-
ment to a "weak autonomy" model of federalism that would protect state and local regulation
against excessive federal preemption).
' Cf Michelman, supra note 249, at 303 (noting that conservative Justices' commitment to
federalism subsides when it conflicts with their commitment to property rights).
N' 493 U.S. 52 (1989).
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takings claim as when state or local governments were defendants,268
while in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,2 69 the Court applied the same
constitutional tests to a claim seeking invalidation of a federal statute
under the Public Use Clause as when state and local governments
were defendants.2 70 The Court offered no hint that it considered ei-
ther its takings jurisprudence or an underlying definition of property
to be different when it considered a federally imposed user fee rather
than one imposed by a state government.2
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit, which under the Tucker Act is
the sole forum that can award just compensation exceeding ten thou-
sand dollars against the United States,2 freely applies Supreme Court
precedent reviewing state court decisions concerning claims brought
273against state and local governments.
It is true that in two recent decisions on federal statutory redefini-
tions of property rights, Hodel v. Irvin 74 and Eastern Enterprises v.
Apfel,275 the Court held that the respective property owners were due
. Id. at 59-64 (rejecting a claim that charges deducted from an award granted by the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal did not affect a taking, and in the process applying but distin-
guishing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV, Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), and Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980)).
2" 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
270 Id. at 1014-15 (applying, among other cases, Midkff and Berman to a claim that a federal
statute requiring disclosure of trade secrets to competitors with just compensation was invalid
under the Public Use Clause).
' See, e.g., Sperry, 493 U.S. at 62 n.8 (comparing user fee in Sperry to similar fee in Webb's Fa-
mous Pharmacies); Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1015 (comparing "procompetitive purpose" in Monsanto
to similar purpose in Midkiffi.
:71 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2000).
See, e.g., Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (ap-
plying Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001), to correct its earlier decisions in Palm Beach
Isles Assoc. v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000) and Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United
States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 1994), regarding the "parcel as a whole" rule). Earlier deci-
sions seemed to indicate that the Federal Circuit had begun to develop its own approach to
regulatory takings in the gaps left open by Supreme Court decisions reviewing state regulation,
although at the time commentators noted that such idiosyncrasies were more the result of ideo-
logical, anti-regulatory commitments than any federalist or programmatic approach the circuit
had adopted. See Michael C. Blumm, Twenty Years of Environmental Law: Role Reversals between
Congress and the Executive, Judicial Activism Undermining the Environment, and the Proliferation of En-
vironmental (and Anti-Environmental) Groups, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 5, 10-11 (2001) (describing the
Court of Federal Claims' increasing trend toward expansively construing the Takings Clause
against federal regulation); David F. Coursen, The Takings Jurisprudence of the Court of Federal
Claims and the Federal Circuit, 29 ENVTL. L. 821, 828-31 (1999) (describing the ideological effect
on the court's determinations and the lack of clarity and circumspection in its decisions); Doug-
las T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: A Critical Analysis and Assessment of the Pro-
gress So Far, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 509, 533-38 (1998) (discussing establishment of the
Federal Circuit and Court of Federal Claims). Bass Enterprises, among other decisions, demon-
strates that the Federal Circuit considers the Supreme Court's takings decisions to apply equally
to all state actors, federal or otherwise.
270 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
275 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
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compensation for having suffered takings imposed by the federal
government. This relatively rare result might indicate that the Court
enforces the Takings Clause more strictly against the federal govern-
ment than the states.27 Neither decision, however, indicates that the
fact that the Court was reviewing federal action determined its result.
Rather, in Hodel the Court held that the challenged statute effected a
taking by expropriating, without compensation, an essential right of
property, the right to pass valuable property to one's heirs. 7  The
character of the property right taken, and not the identity of the state
actor, was the reason the plaintiff was owed compensation. Similarly,
the four-Justice plurality in Eastern Enterprises held that the challenged
statute's imposition of "severe retroactive liability" on the plaintiffs
substantially interfered with their reasonable investment-backed ex-
pectation and therefore effected a taking.278 Thus, the character of
the government action and the extent of the burden on the property
owner tipped the balance in favor of the property owner, not the
identity of the state actor. In recent decisions, including those from
2005, the Court has not cited Hodel and Eastern Enterprises as examples
of more stringent federal court review of the federal government:
the majority in Kelo and Justice Kennedy in Lingle cited Eastern Enter-
prises as relevant precedent for considering actions against state agen-
cies, 79 and the Court has repeatedly cited Hodel as relevant outside of
the context of federal government actions.80
In short, the Court invokes federalist principles regularly in its tak-
ings decisions, and, at least during the Rehnquist Court, a majority of
Justices appeared to be committed to deferring to state and local
government authority over land-use controls. And by limiting federal
6 See Sterk, supra note 249, at 255-56 (examining Hodel and Eastern Enterprises).
211 See Hode4 481 U.S. at 716 (describing the character of the government regulation as ex-
traordinary and unprecedented).
278 See Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 528-32 (using regulatory takings framework to deter-
mine constitutionality of retroactive liability); see also id. at 549-50 (Kennedy, J., concurring and
dissenting) (finding that the statute's retroactivity violated the Due Process Clause rather than
the Takings Clause). Justice Kennedy's separate decision provided the deciding vote in Eastern
Enterprises.
"9 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 493 (2005) (citing Justice Kennedy's sepa-
rate decision in Eastern Enterprises for the proposition that the Constitution may require the in-
validation of especially irrational government actions); Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S.
528, 548 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing his separate decision in Eastern Enterprises for
the proposition that the substantive due process doctrine protects property owners from espe-
cially irrational government actions).
mo See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 634-35 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (citing Hodel for the proposition that the Court has "never held that a takings claim is de-
feated simply on account of the lack of a personal financial investment by a postenactment ac-
quirer of property, such as a donee, heir, or devisee"); Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S.
156, 170 (1998) (citing Hodel for the proposition that "possession, control, and disposition
are... valuable rights" of property, no matter if the property has little or no value to the
owner).
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constitutional protections, the Court inevitably defers to the preroga-
tives of state and local governments and thereby helps bring about a
federalist land-use system. But, as Part IV argues, in the 2005 takings
decisions federalism operated as merely part of the Court's broader,
legal process-based commitment to institutional settlement and com-
petencies.
IV. OF INSTITUTIONS AND COMPETENCIES: THE LEGAL PROCESS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
The approaches to takings law discussed in Part II seek to identify
both what question should be asked about the extent of federal con-
stitutional protections against takings and how it should be answered.
The federalist approach discussed in Part III primarily asserts that
federal constitutional law should not dominate the regulation and
taking of property, which is largely of state and local concern. But
none of these approaches frames takings law in the way the Court did
in its 2005 decisions. Resolving a broad array of substantive and pro-
cedural issues, Kelo, Lingle, and San Remo provide a vision of structure
and process that is consumed with the question of who should decide
which question when-not what should be decided. This Part argues
that the Court's focus most closely resembles that of the legal process
school, and appears to borrow three of that approach's core concepts
relating to governing institutions and their relative competencies.
Recognizing the role of legal process in substantive constitutional
doctrine helps us to understand the historical dynamic that resulted
in the 2005 decisions, offers some predictive insight into the future of
takings law (and especially of the Public Use Clause, if the Roberts
Court decides to revisit the issue and overturn or limit Kelo), and en-
ables better understanding of the generalized dissatisfaction scholars
and the public have with the Court's takings jurisprudence.
A. Legal Process: Institutional Settlement and Competency
The legal process school (or approach) to governance and adju-
dication came to dominate legal education and public law scholar-
ship in the post-war period, and today it remains a pervasive, if not
wholly predominant, understanding of the modem regulatory state
and especially of the judiciary's role within it. 281 Five members of the
2" See William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of the Legal Process, 107 HARV.
L. REV. 2031, 2032-33 (1994) [hereinafter Eskridge & Frickey, Making] (describing evolution of
legal process theory); William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement:
Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REv. 707, 709-10 (1991) (examining the
evolution of legal process theory); Mark Fenster, The Birth of a "Logical System": Thurman Arnold
and the Making of Modern Administrative Law, 84 OR. L. REV. 69, 124-27 (2005) (identifying the
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Rehnquist Court-Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, all of whom remain on the Roberts Court-were explicitly in-
troduced to the legal process approach as Harvard law students. 2 Its
great expression was in the unpublished casebook "materials" that
bore the name The Legal Process, which were developed by Harvard
professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, used in classes at Harvard,
and adopted in mimeographed form for use by the authors' col-
leagues and by other legal academics. 2s3 The approach arose out of a
confluence of influences, including Justice Brandeis's opinions on
the Supreme Court (such as Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins ), legal re-
alism, Felix Frankfurter's administrative law and federal jurisdiction
scholarship and teaching at Harvard, and, after Brandeis left the
Court and Frankfurter joined it, decisions by Justices Frankfurter,
Harlan, and Stone.8 5
Legal process proceeded from three basic claims. First, law is pur-
posive and instrumental, and ultimately a means to "solve the basic
problems of social living" and to enable the prosperity and smooth
functioning of modern society.8 6 Second, the "legal process" extends
beyond formal judicial adjudication and statutes, and includes both
elements of the legal process approach); Mark Tushnet & Timothy Lynch, The Project of the Har-
vard Forewords: A Social and Intellectual Inquiry, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 463, 475 (1995) (discuss-
ing contributions of legal process to constitutional theory); Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settle-
ment in a GlobalizingJudicial System, 54 DUKE L.J. 1143, 1149-50 (2005) (describing dominance
of legal process school over federal courts law).
211 See William N. Eskridge,Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to The
Legal Process, in HART & SACKS, supra note 11, at li-cxxxvi [hereinafter Eskridge & Frickey, In-
troduction) (commenting on "[t]he pedagogical importance of the work" and its "place of sub-
stantial importance in the history of American jurisprudence"); see alsoJ. Harvie Wilkinson III,
Foreword: The Question of Process, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1387, 1387 (2000) (Chief Judge of the Fourth
Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals declaring his commitment to legal process approach).
"' On the history of the Hart and Sacks materials, see Eskridge & Frickey, Making, supra note
281, at 2033-42, describing Hart's work on materials for his legislation course at Harvard, and
on its adoption by other legal academics, see Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction, supra note 282, at
cii-civ. They were finally published, more as an historical text than as a working casebook, in
1994. HART & SACKS, supra note 11. As Neil Duxbury has observed, contemporary readers can-
not replicate the materials' role in producing its main intended effect, the "classroom experi-
ence" of legal process. Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in American Jurispru-
dence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 601, 653 (1993).
304 U.S 64 (1938).
"5 See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE
JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA
223-28 (2000) (examining how process jurisprudence affected the image of Brandeis and Erie);
Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction, supra note 282, at liv-lxviii (describing an evolution in public
law thinking from 1893 to 1941); Fenster, supra note 281, at 124-27 (examining emergence of
legal process approach); Felix Frankfurter & Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Business of the Supreme Court
at October Term, 1934, 49 HARV. L. REV. 68, 90-91, 94-96 (1935) (observing that the Supreme
Court strictly scrutinizes federal courts' power to adjudicate because of their limited jurisdic-
tion).
HART & SACKS, supra note 11, at 148.
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private ordering (which Hart and Sacks described as the "primary
process of social adjustment " 287) and the modern regulatory state.2
Third, the processes and structures of the legal process, which com-
pose a "coordinated, functioning whole made up of a set of interre-
lated, interacting parts, 28 9 are "obviously more fundamental than the
substantive arrangements in the structure of a society... since they
are at once the source of the substantive arrangements and the indis-
pensable means of making them work effectively., 290 In brief, as both
an academic and normative matter, "process," defined quite broadly,
overshadowed and perhaps even transcended substance.I
Three fundamental concepts and one significant insight from the
legal process school are relevant to current takings jurisprudence,
and I will focus here only on them. 2 First, the key legal process con-
cept of "institutional settlement" refers to a society's development of
"duly established procedures" that are employed by competent insti-
tutions to arrive at substantive decisions that are in turn binding and
legitimate as a result of the process by which they are made. 3 These
institutional arrangements include the federal system of governance,
which, Henry Hart explained, offers "varied facilities, providing al-
ternative means of working out.., solutions of problems which can-
not be settled unilaterally .... This includes the system of federal
courts 295 as well as state laws and institutions. 296 The structured rela-
2" Id. at 159-61.
Id. at 342.
"' Id. at cxxxvii.
"o Id. at 3-4.
See Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950's, 21 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 561, 569 (1988) (ex-
plaining the view that the legitimacy of law turns on observation of duly established proce-
dures).
M The primary literature produced during the heyday of the legal process approach, and
the secondary literature commenting on and chronicling the approach, is vast. For summaries,
see Duxbury, supra note 283 (examining the evolution of process jurisprudence); Eskridge &
Frickey, Introduction, supra note 282 (discussing the development of the legal process and its
impact on various generations of lawyers). I am only extracting some of the approach's tenets,
although the ones I discuss are among the most significant.
'9' HART & SACKS, supra note 11, at 4.
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 490
(1954).
5 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV.
953, 960 (1994) (examining Hart and Wechsler's influence on federal courts scholarship). Fed-
eral courts as a subject of academic inquiry was, contemporaneous with the rise of legal process,
overtaken by what has become known as the Hart & Wechsler "paradigm," so-called because of
the casebook edited by legal process theorists Henry Hart (who was also developing the legal
process casebook materials at the same time) and Herbert Wechsler. See HENRY M. HART,JR. &
HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (Foundation Press, Inc.
ed. 1953); Fallon, supra (examining the Hart and Wechsler paradigm). The Hart and Wechsler
approach to federal courts shared with the legal process school an institutionalist focus, a func-
tionalist approach to governing structures, and a triumphant celebration of the specific, narrow
competencies that the judiciary offers. HART & WECHSLER, supra, at xi-xii. Hart and Wechsler's
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tionship among these various parts, as well as the interrelated and in-
ternal procedures utilized to enable this complicated apparatus to
function, constitute the institutional settlement that the legal process
school both privileged and over which it obsessed.
"Institutional competency," a second key legal process concept,
asserts that a satisfactory institutional settlement would both assign
the kinds of disputes or issues that arise to the institutions best able to
resolve them, and enable institutions to develop and employ the op-
timal procedures to reach the best results.97 Put another way, institu-
tional settlement both assumes and produces competent institu-
tions-and, put together, institutional settlement around competent
institutions produces good, informed policy.298 A regulatory agency,
for example, acquires expert skill from its technical knowledge and
the experience that it develops through continuing administrative re-
sponsibility over a statutorily-created, regulatory scheme and through
its promulgation of appropriate rules and procedures.2 9 A narrowly-
focused, expert agency thus has greater competency in the area in
which it operates than a court of general jurisdiction, which will have
only a fleeting concern about the statute, the agency, and its imple-
300menting program.
A third concept arising out of the legal process school that is rele-
vant to the Court's takings jurisprudence relates to the specific proc-
esses and competencies of the judiciary--or, as the preface in the
Hart and Wechsler casebook on federal courts stated, "what courts
institutionalism was more narrowly focused on federalism and the preservation of spheres of
state sovereign autonomy as opposed to legal process's broader consideration of decision-
making institutions, while Hart and Wechsler's functionalism focused on the separation of fed-
eral powers, while, again, legal process more broadly considered the legal system as an array of
separate yet interlocking institutions. On the relationship between the Hart and Wechsler ap-
proach to federal courts and the Hart and Sacks approach to legal process, see Akhil Reed
Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REv. 688, 689-91 (1989) (book review).
See HART & SACKS, supra note 11, at 168-74 (examining the separation of powers between
federal and state governments, as well as their concurrent power over certain matters).
See id. at 110-12 (discussing the process by which institutions make decisions in a society).
2 See id. at 154 (arguing that procedural safeguards will lead to "well-informed and wise de-
cisions"); Eskridge & Peller, supra note 281, at 721-22 (examining why procedure is important
in the Hart and Sacks materials); AnthonyJ. Sebok, ReadingThe Legal Process, 94 MICH. L. REV.
1571, 1574 (1996) (reviewing HART & SACKS, supra note 11).
1 Neither the Hart and Sacks material nor the legal process school as a whole focused ex-
tensively on administrative agencies and administrative law. As I explain elsewhere, the legal
process emerged in part out of an earlier academic and judicial ferment in that field. See Fen-
ster, supra note 281, at 123-27 (examining the emergence of the legal process approach).
See HART & SACKS, supra note 11, at 1290 (explaining that specialized agencies develop
their expertise while continuously administering the whole statutory scheme, an experience
that a court does not have).
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are good for."30' The Hart and Sacks materials presented a straight-
forward statement of these competencies in contrast to those of po-
litical institutions: courts, Hart and Sacks advised, employ reason, as
constrained by established technique and procedure, to resolve a dis-
pute. By contrast, substantive policy disputes that can only be re-
solved by preference or "sheer guesswork" are better "left to be made
by count of noses at the ballot box."30 2 Courts, unlike legislatures,
utilize "reasoned elaboration" in resolving a dispute, explicating the
"general directive arrangement" that applies "in a way which is consis-
tent with the other established application of it," and "in the way
which best serves the principles and policies it expresses. ' ' 3 3 A court
that interprets a statute, therefore, must find the purpose of the stat-
ute and the general policy or principle it is intended to further, and
then reason towards a result consistent with the statute's purpose;3M4
while a court that applies common law doctrine must similarly at-
tempt to discern from precedent the doctrine's purpose and rule,
principle, or standard, and elaborate how the court's conclusions
about the case and controversy before it flow from the generally ap-
plicable law. 3o 5
Although the original legal process materials that Hart and Sacks
developed concerned statutory and general common law, other
process advocates more explicitly extended the approach's insights to
constitutional adjudication. As Hart's student Alexander Bickel,3o6
among others, characterized it, Supreme Court review of the consti-
tutionality of state action works as part of an or anic web of compe-
tent institutions with set tasks and competencies. Constitutional ad-
1 HART & I€WECHSLER, supra note 295, at xi (introducing one of the book's themes-the ap-
propriate relationship between the federal courts and other instrumentalities of the govern-
ment).
, 2 HART & SACKS, supra note 11, at 110-12 (contrasting problems of reason from those of
preference).
Id. at 146-47.
Id.
Id. at 644 (creating the necessary harmony in the abstract legal arrangements).
See Michael Wells, Behind the Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process Tradition in the Law
of Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. REV. 609, 619 (1991) (listing the students of Lon Fuller, Henry Hart,
Albert Sacks, and Herbert Wechsler who eventually became known as the legal process theo-
rists).
307 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 24-27 (1962) (discussing howjudicial review is particularly suited to the Court
because of the functions and nature of the judicial and legislative branches). For more on
Bickel and the explicit extension of legal process to constitutional issues in response to the rise
of the Warren Court, see LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 35-42
(1996) (chronicling Bickel's "opposition to the activist judicial review and realism" of the War-
ren Court and the process jurisprudents' search in vain for "a constitutional theory that would
reinforce the integrity of the legal process, enable judicial decisions to transcend results, justify
the negotiated document the Court had produced in Brown, and reduce worry about the
counter-majoritarian difficulty").
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judication by the Supreme Court is limited to guaranteeing certain
basic civil rights as a matter of positive law;"s protecting the integrity
of the political process against systematic distortion through exclu-• n r.. .. 309
sion or oppression of minorities; and, above all, to the wise and
prudent use of the Court's jurisdiction and power in order to pre-
serve the Court's "mystic," legitimating function and to educate the
nation as to correct constitutional principles.1 ° When the Court
wisely follows what Bickel famously called the "passive virtues" of
avoiding avoidable conflict, it insulates itself from controversial po-
litical decisions and allows other, more directly accountable branches
to assume the responsibility for resolving them.3 1  The judiciary's
specific institutional competence, then, is to articulate and passively
enforce impersonal and enduring principles that would resolve, more
through persuasion and education than through coercion, the prob-
lem that judicial review of the democratically elected political
branches is distinctly counter-majoritarian
One final insight from legal process theory (although not unique
to it315) will prove helpful in understanding the Court's takings juris-
prudence-the institutional decision to rely upon rules or standards
.... 314
in creating general directive arrangements. In order to bind itself
and other institutions that follow its directives, a court (or any institu-
tion that issues commands) may place different degrees of definite-
ness in the form those directives take. It may decide to issue an au-
thoritative rule whose command is triggered upon the determination
' See Paul A. Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. REV. 533, 545-51
(1951) (arguing that freedom of expression is a form of process and therefore properly within
the Court's judicial review of guaranteed procedural rights); Herbert Wechsler, The Political
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Govern-
ment, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 558-60 (1954) (asserting that Congress, not the Court, has the
ultimate power to manage federalism).
' This revision of legal process to focus on political process occurred most explicitly in John
Hart Ely's DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OFJUDICIAL REVIEW 73-179 (1980) (discussing
the Court's role in protecting minority rights in the political process), and Jesse H. Choper's
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF
THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 4-59 (1980) (discussing the relationship between judicial
review and a majoritarian democracy).
"o See BICKEL, supra note 307, at 26, 29-33 (stating that not only are courts a "highly effective
educational institution[,]... [t]heir insulation and the marvelous mystery of time give [them]
the capacity to appeal to men's better natures, to call forth their aspirations, which may have
been forgotten in the moment's hue and cry").
" See id. at 164-66, 197-98 (citing cases in which the Court's disposal on secondary issues
allowed the legislative branch to properly resolve the primary issues).
"" See id. at 16-28.
313 Seegenerally Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 382-83 (1985) (citing
a variety of sources to define and summarize the rule/standard distinction); Kathleen M. Sulli-
van, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 56-66 (1992) (same).
1 See HART & SACKS, supra note 11, at 138-41 (providing a background on the use of rules
and standards).
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of facts; or it may decide to grant a future decision-maker broader
discretion though a standard that requires not only the determina-
tion of facts, but also the appraisal of consequences, moral justifica-
tions, and human experience. More likely, the institution will
choose some point along a continuum between these two poles, or it
may include both rules and standards in its legal arrangements.
The choice of rules and standards is itself a decision based on consid-
erations of institutional competence-with what specificity, a drafter
inquires, can I predict the regularity of disputes and the correct reso-
lution to them, or to what extent should I delegate determinations to
a future decision-maker?3
Concerned with governing institutions rather than politics, and
with procedures rather than substance, legal process sought to pre-
serve the status quo of post-war liberal consensus s.3 1  Despite-and
perhaps because of-its prominence, the approach has faced signifi-
cant criticism and revision, especially over the past two decades. Crit-
ics from both the critical left and the utilitarian middle and right
have challenged many of the legal process advocates' bedrock con-
cepts, including its assumptions that law could be divorced from pol-
icy, that the political branches and regulatory agencies could operate
free from capture by powerful interest groups, and that the judiciary
could formulate and follow an objective, external standard based
solely upon reason and prudence.3 9  Legal process's vision of institu-
tions in particular no longer reflects the complicated operations of
the contemporary federal, state, and local administrative agency as an
institution implementing public law programs in an advanced capital-
ist state, nor does it compare well with more sophisticated theoretical
approaches to understanding agency structures and operations.20 In
' See id. at 138-41 (showing the relative flexibility that rules and standards can afford in
administration and adjudication).
" See id. at 140-41 (discussing the effective interplay between rules and standards in achiev-
ing desired results).
"' See id. at 140 (entailing differences in the form of control).
... See Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction, supra note 282, at cxi (arguing that Hart and Sacks
rarely explored actual political issues relating to democracy, but rather conformed to the politi-
cal culture of the times); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1151,
1183-85 (1985) (demonstrating how the legal process theorists equated subordination to exist-
ing law with peace and order). See generally Duxbury, supra note 283, at 642-53 (contextualizing
legal process within broader academic conceptions of postwar consensus and the primacy of
democratic procedures).
"' A useful summary, with citation to the numerous critiques lodged by critical legal studies
and law and economics critics, appears in Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction, supra note 282, at
cxviii-cxxv, and Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Micro-
analysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1398-1402 (1996).
" See Eskridge & Peller, supra note 281, at 710 (discussing attacks on legal process theory
from multiple viewpoints); Rubin, supra note 319, at 1424-33 (illustrating how institutional mi-
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other words, critics have argued, legal process assumed too much of
institutions and procedures, and knew or predicted too little about
the advancement of-and frustrations with-the modern, post-war
state.
Liberal and conservative proponents of civil liberties and rights
have also asserted that legal process was blind to enumerated consti-
tutional rights, including the Takings Clause, and as such embraced
structure and process over rights.3 2 ' This criticism, too, focuses on the
avoidance of substantive issues in legal process-although it appears
to view law as an instrumental means to reach a primary goal of sub-
stantive ends, legal process remained fixed on process with such ob-
session that it assumed the correct legal process represented an end
in itself.3 22 Legal process thus abandoned the doctrinal formalism of
the pre-legal realist era in favor of an "institutional formalism" that
fetishized abstract principles of governance rather than abstract legal
rules. 23 No less than doctrinal formalism, which constituted a domi-
nant underlying jurisprudential and ideological structure shaping the
doctrinal development of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century
constitutional law,2 4 so legal process remains, fifty years after its
emergence, a key logic in the Court's takings law.
B. The Legal Process of Takings Law
35Rather than ushering in a rollback of the regulatory state, the
federal constitutional Takings Clause has now become suffused with
legal process conceptions of passive judicial review and deference to
the decisions of other branches of government. Each of the 2005 de-
croanalysis can address substantive value choices and remedy the shortcomings of legal proc-
ess).
3N See EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 214 (arguing that the Constitution contains "large numbers of
substantive guarantees that on their face at least are not directed to matters of structure and
process"); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89
YALE L.J. 1063, 1065, 1067 (1980) (same).
3n See Tribe, supra note 321, at 1071 (explaining the quandary facing legal process propo-
nents who argue that process is not merely instrumental to substance).
323 NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 263 (1995) ("By invoking the
principle of institutional settlement, it has been said, Hart and Sacks introduced 'institutional
formalism' into American jurisprudence.") (citation omitted); see also RICHARD A. POSNER,
OVERCOMING LAW 75-77 (1995) (associating legal process school with classical legal formalism);
Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 895 (1987) (noting analogous ap-
proach of early-twentieth-century formalism with Wechsler's use of legal process theory to cri-
tique the Warren Court).
32' See Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITr. L. REV. 1 (1983) (chronicling the rise
and fall of doctrinal formalism); MORTONJ. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW
1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 9-31 (1992) (examining the historical effects of
classical legal thought). But see G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 167-
70 (2000) (complicating the "Formalist/Realist debate" of the early twentieth century).
3" See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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cisions described or assumed the existence of a complicated set of in-
stitutions involved in the land-use regulatory process, each with its
own significant role to play in reaching and implementing important
decisions, as well as in checking the authority of other institutions.
And each decision presented judicial review as a process of faithfully
following precedent, fully elaborating and explaining doctrine, and,
ultimately, deferring to elected officials except in narrowly defined
instances when the government has clearly violated a well-articulated
rule. The Court conjured up the specter of property rights in its ritu-
alistic invocation of fairness principles and its concept of "functional
equivalence," but ultimately presented a judicial posture and set of
doctrines that place the Takings Clause squarely within the well-worn
confines of legal process.
1. The Institutions of Land-Use Regulation and Takings Litigation
The 2005 decisions display a great faith in settled allocations of
decision-making, in the relative competencies of the institutions in
charge of land-use controls, and in the institutional system through
which property owners challenge those controls. The majority in
Kelo, for example, described a local government that had relied upon
a state statute for authority to engage in comprehensive planning.
The city "carefully formulated" and deliberated over an economic de-
velopment plan, and devised a redevelopment that sought to coordi-
nate multiple uses of an area that incidentally included petitioners'
326homes. Unhappy citizens and property owners could seek changes
to these processes through the state legislatures and state constitu-
tion 3 as well as in city elections. The institutions were well-settled
and the procedures they used appeared careful and trustworthy. Ac-
cordingly, they were constitutionally valid-and in their absence, and
only in their absence, would the Constitution permit a court to overrule
the exercise of eminent domain.32 s
. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483 (2005) (describing the plans for the
Fort Trumbull area).
Id. at 488-89 (declining to "second-guess" the New London decisions).
Cf Clayton P. Gillette, Kelo and the Local Political Process, 34 HOFsTRA L. REV. 13, 20 (2005)
(characterizing Kelo as "defin[ing] the conditions under which the probability of [political]
abuse is minimal and defer[ring] to the political process when those criteria are satisfied");
Julia D. Mahoney, Kelo s Legacy: Eminent Domain and the Future of Property Rights, 2005 SUP. CT.
REV. 103, 129-32 (arguing that judicial oversight provides an essential check on the political
process). This is not to suggest that such plans are always efficacious, or that the Court suggests
as much. On the necessary but troubled relationship between local governments' use of emi-
nent domain and their insufficiently effective efforts in city planning, see Wendell E. Pritchett,
Beyond Kelo: Thinking About Urban Redevelopment in the 21st Century, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 895,
907-15 (2006).
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In San Remo, in addition to acknowledging Congress's role in lim-
iting its authority to re-consider state court decisions that settle fed-
eral constitutional claims, the majority described a functional fed-
eral system in which state and federal courts share responsibility for
judicial review of constitutional claims, and in which the system's in-
dividual parts operate in a complementary, efficient way to resolve
disputes. It is a systemic strength rather than a constitutional flaw
that a plaintiff who follows the dictates of Williamson County and files
her initial state claims in state court may never have a federal court
consider her federal constitutional claims.3 0 The Court's assumption
that "the weighty interests in finality and comity" outweigh whatever
advantages that takings plaintiffs might gain from the chance to ar-
gue their claims before an additional court itself assumed that the in-
stitutional structure the court affirmed offered significant advan-
tages.3 3 ' First, the system's parts are interchangeable-it should make
no difference, for the purpose of constitutional adjudication, that a
plaintiff begins in state or federal court. Second, the administrative
and judicial exhaustion requirement enables the best decision-maker,
a state court, to conduct the initial adjudication of a matter that is
based on state substantive and administrative law. Third, the impor-
tance of preserving the system's functionality and efficiency super-
sedes any efforts to protect an individual property owner from state
court adjudication that might allow her to bypass the system's settled
process. And fourth, the system offers sufficient safeguards by allow-
ing lower federal courts to consider federal constitutional issues when
the state constitution's analogous provisions are not equivalent to the
federal constitution, and by assuring property owners that they can
appeal adverse state court judgments under federal constitutional law
to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Lingle, too, invoked the institutional settlement of land-use con-
trols. Recall that the Agins "substantial advancement" test made three
fundamental errors: it mistook a substantive due process test for a
takings test; it reviewed the wrong end of a regulatory transaction by
considering the government's purpose and actions rather than the
regulation's effects on a property owner; and it invited a court to sub-
'" See San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 336-38, 345 (uphold-
ing the Ninth Circuit's refusal to reconsider petitioners' constitutional claims on the grounds
that Congress has not excepted takings claims from the Full Faith and Credit Statute's com-
mand to respect the decisions of state courts); cf id. at 348 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the
judgment) (agreeing that the Full Faith and Credit Statute precludes re-litigation, but question-
ing the Williamson County rule that requires claims to be filed in state court first).
3" See supra notes 71-75 (discussing Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton
Bank ofJohnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985)).
3" San Remo, 545 U.S. at 345.
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stitute its judgment for that of the government.3 2 The latter two er-
rors-which follow from the first, doctrinal one-assumed that cer-
tain questions regarding regulatory purpose and mechanics are for the
judiciary to decide. This is exactly backwards-under the Takings
Clause, thejudiciary only considers the regulatory effects on the prop-
erty owner.
Obviously, deference is not a new concept to takings law. Courts
have long recognized that every extension of a constitutional right for
compensation against a government's use of its police powers, and
every extension of the public-use requirement on eminent domain, is
also a limitation on long-settled and significant institutional authority
that intrudes on legislative prerogative over social policy, 33 4 and that
may cripple the government's regulatory authority and willingness to
exercise it.3 35 But considered together as a comprehensive overview
of the Court's approach to substantive and procedural takings doc-
trines, the 2005 decisions signal that the Court's primary focus is on
administrative and judicial process rather than on the extent of sub-
stantive property rights protections.
2. The Limits ofJudicial Competency and Judicial Review
The 2005 decisions exemplify a modest approach to judicial re-
view in two ways: they faithfully followed and elaborated upon prece-
dent, and they upheld mostly open-ended standards that require
lower courts to defer to the regulatory and eminent domain decisions
of local governments. In terms of precedent, both the San Remo ma-
jority and Chief Justice Rehnquist's San Remo concurrence explained
that they were bound by Williamson County's exhaustion requirement
to uphold the Ninth Circuit's decision, although the four-Justice con-
.. See supra text accompanying notes 49-52 (summarizing Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc, 544
U.S. 528, 540-44 (2005)).
... See supra note 67 and accompanying text (summarizing Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542).
See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 103, 133-34 n.30 (1978) (hold-
ing that regulations that are "reasonably related to the implementation of a policy... [that is]
expected to produce a widespread public benefit and applicable to all similarly situated prop-
erty" does not effect a taking); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) ("Subject to specific
constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been de-
clared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main
guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation, whether it be Congress legislat-
ing concerning the District of Columbia. . . or the States legislating concerning local affairs.");
United States ex rel. TVA v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 551 (1946) ("[I]t is the function of Congress to
decide what type of taking is for a public use .... ."); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 280 (1928)
(refusing to find violation of Takings Clause where the government is forced to make a choice
that is unavoidable and its considerations of social policy "are not unreasonable").
115 See, e.g., Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 ("Government hardly could go on if to
some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law.").
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currence indicated an interest in reconsidering the litigation exhaus-
tion requirement. 36 Lingle restated and stitched all of the significant
regulatory takings decisions of the Rehnquist and Burger Courts to-
gether into a coherent whole-although it did so to overrule a stray
part of one longstanding decision.337
To understand Kelo's fidelity to Berman and Midkiff recall that Jus-
tice Thomas's dissent conceded that ruling against the government
defendant would require overruling a century of precedent interpret-
ing the Public Use Clause.338 Justice O'Connor's dissent attempted to
find a middle ground that would keep Berman and Midkiffs deferen-
tial posture but excise the "errant language" in those decisions that
confused eminent domain authority with the police power.33 9 But
even if the language to which Justice O'Connor objected were re-
moved, the core of the Court's settled deference to legislative deter-
minations under the Public Use Clause would still stand-and, sig-
nificantly, the Kelo majority did not rely upon or even cite either the
"errant language" or the police power. As the majority noted, Justice
O'Connor's proposed reading of public use precedent departed con-
siderably both from the factual predicate of those decisions, which
did not require harmful uses in order to authorize the taking, and
from those decisions' examination of only the legislature's purpose in
340the taking rather than the land's future uses.
All three decisions also provided fulsome explanations of the
principles upon which they relied-Kelo, in affirming the need to de-
fer to well-formulated, authorized decisions of local governments,34'
San Remo, in affirming the need to respect state court judgments and
342
authority to decide federal constitutional claims, and Lingle, in ex-
plicating the regulatory takings doctrine. 3 Lingle is especially telling
in this regard. Recall that Lingle performed two significant moves: it
found an unbroken narrative in the messy development of regulatory
takings doctrine, and it discerned a basic principle that explained a
complicated set of default standards and exceptional rules.44 Due
336 San Remo, 545 U.S. at 341-42, 345-46; id. at 348-51 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the
judgment).
... See supra text accompanying notes 53-64.
'm See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 506, 515 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(conceding that ruling against the government defendant would require overruling a century of
precedent interpreting the Public Use Clause).
.. Id. at 499-501 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S.
229, 240 (1984) and Berman, 348 U.S. at 32-33).
o See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 486 n.16; see also id. at 480-82 (summarizing Berman and Midkif).
' Id. at 484-87.
142 San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 342-47 (2005).
m' See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536-40 (2005).
4' See supra text accompanying notes 53-69 (discerning a basic principle that explained a
complicated set of default standards and exceptional rules).
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both to its unanimity and its efforts to restate and justify the universe
of takings tests, Lingle is the most authoritative regulatory takings de-
cision since Penn Central, notwithstanding the fact that the question
presented to the Court merely required it to explain and justify a
stray doctrine that had never been enforced by the Supreme Court.
Doing so, Lingle also exemplified the 2005 decisions' effort to
match the proper legal form to the degree of deference that the
lower courts should give to decisions of political and administrative
agencies. Lingle explained that "[o]utside [of the] two relatively nar-
row categories" of "per se" takings and the "special application" of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine for certain types of develop-
ment conditions, courts should apply the multi-factor Penn Central
standard. 345  To the former, narrowly-defined set of regulations,
courts must apply the heightened scrutiny of strong rules; to the lat-
ter, much larger category courts must apply the more deferential
standard. Kelo similarly directed lower courts through legal form, re-
fusing to adopt any "rigid formulas and intensive scrutiny" and choos-
ing instead to defer to the legislative determination of public use.346
The Court rejected both a strict "use by the public" rule, which would
limit the legislature's authority to respond to the "always evolving
needs of society, '347 and Justice O'Connor's suggestion of a middle
ground between a narrow, bright-line rule and a deferential stan-
348dard, arguing that any test other than a deferential one would lead
courts to review the wisdom of the legislature's determination and
would ultimately cause legislative and regulatory uncertainty and de-
lays in the planning and redevelopment process.349 The Court thus
offered a legal standard so open-ended and deferential that it left
open the question of when, short of clear evidence of corruption, a
taking for economic development purposes is sufficiently suspect to
• • • 350
warrant invalidation.
For the 2005 decisions, judicial competency extended to the ques-
tion of decisional allocation and to the legal form of those deci-
sions-with the assumption that the form will likely be some type of
deferential standard-but not to the substantive matter of property
rights. And thus the legal process of takings includes not only judi-
cial competency but also the presumed competency of political and
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538-39, 546-48.Kelo, 545 U.S. at 482-83.
'7 Id. at 479; see also id. at 479 n.8 (noting that state courts had frequently circumvented or
abandoned the "use by the public test" during times of significant economic development).
'4 See id. at 500-01 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (asserting that economic development takings
violate the Public Use Clause, but allowing that takings resulting in privately owned property
would be valid if the former use "inflicted affirmative harm on society").
Id. at 488-89.
-, Id.
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regulatory institutions as well as the system within which all of the
relevant institutions have their place. The Court has shifted its focus
from the protection of an individual's constitutional property rights
from interference by the regulatory state to the decisional authority
and processes of the regulatory state itself.
35
'
CONCLUSION: THE SATISFACTIONS AND FRUSTRATIONS OF TAKINGS
PROCESS
When courts adhere to the legal process approach, they resolve
disputes conservatively-that is, in a jurisprudential, rather than po-
litical, sense. Legal process constrains judicial efforts to overturn
precedent, especially when the motives reflect ideological reasons-
although in doing so, of course, the legal process approach has the
ideological effect of protecting the status quo and stabilizing constitu-
tional common law. In addition, legal process pushes courts to ac-
cept and affirm an existing system of governance and existing distri-
butions of entitlements, rather than risk judicial legitimacy by
imposing counter-majoritarian judgments against the will of politi-
cally accountable institutions.53 And legal process counsels courts to
avoid substantive legal issues that concern significant social and po-
litical problems, and to focus their attention instead on procedural
and institutional issues.3 54 Legal process, in short, is a theory ofjudi-
cial restraint that, when adopted, constrains courts that might other-
wise depart from existing legal and political arrangements.
This Article has proposed that the predominance of a legal proc-
ess approach to takings explains the very different approach taken in
the Court's 2005 decisions, when government defendants won in Kelo,
Lingle, and San Remo, from that taken in the 1986 Term, when gov-
s' Cf Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 539 (2002) (rebuffing a statutory and
regulatory takings challenge, brought by regulated parties, to a ratemaking scheme established
by a federal administrative agency under a federal statute on the grounds that "[t]he job of
judges is to ask whether the Commission made choices reasonably within the pale of statutory
possibility," and that it is the "stuff of debate for economists and regulators" to decide the wis-
dom of such choices).
M2 Cf William H. Page, Legal Realism and the Shaping of Modern Antitrust, 44 EMORY L.J. 1, 49-
53 (1995) (describing the constraining influence of legal process theory in the development of
modern antitrust law doctrine); Frank B. Cross, Legal Process, Legal Realism and the Strategic Politi-
cal Effects of Procedural Rules (U. Tex. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No.
79, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=837665 (reporting on an empirical study of the
precedential value of procedural doctrines, and demonstrating that although procedure ap-
pears non-ideological in character, it has ideological effects).
3" See Kimberlh Crenshaw & Gary Peller, The Contradictions of Mainstream Constitutional Theory,
45 UCLA L. REV. 1683, 1712 (1998).
' See Michael Wells, Busting the Hart & Wechsler Paradigm, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 557, 571-73
(1995) (explaining that legal process counsels courts to focus their attention on procedural and
institutional issues).
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ernment defendants lost in three of the four decisions. Two dec-
ades ago, the Court flirted with an active jurisprudence that found
widespread institutional failure resulting in constitutionally suspect
regulation; now, I have argued, the Court has fallen back to the "pas-
sive virtue" of deference to political institutions and a focus on proc-
ess, and as a result has found constitutionally sufficient procedures
that resulted in losing plaintiffs neither receiving compensation nor
enjoining government actions.
The advantage of the latter, present approach is that it avoids con-
flicts with other branches of government-and especially, in the case
of the application of the Takings Clause to land-use controls, with the
several states and their subsidiary local governments. And as with the
somewhat ironic result that it is the liberal, pro-regulatory Justices
that embrace federalist rhetoric in takings decisions, so it is that the
same Justices also embrace a deferential, restrained approach to judi-
cial review in the takings context when they may be less willing to do
so in other substantive areas of law.3 56 Richard Lazarus has com-
plained that conservative Supreme Court Justices, whether because of
their apathy or antipathy towards environmental law, treat environ-
mental statutes as merely another branch of administrative law and
defer to the political branches whenever statutory language allows the
Court to do so. 5  In takings law, it is liberal Justices who treat the
open-ended language of the Fifth Amendment as a type of adminis-
trative law that requires deference to political branches utilizing their
police and eminent domain powers. But leaving aside whatever in-
strumentally ideological objectives the Justices may harbor, legal
process teaches that it is inherently satisfactory and downright virtu-
ous to resolve a difficult question by deferring to the decision of an-
other branch of government, which is itself part of a well-considered
complex of administrative institutions and procedures.
But it can also be a frustrating way to resolve constitutional dis-
putes, especially when the public and bar want a better, more under-
standable explanation. Judicial passivity and institutional settlement
may seem the logical choice to many judges andjurisprudes, but they
sound unduly technocratic and mistaken, if not outrageous, in the
context of an "ownership society" and a culture committed to the
single family home. If nothing else, the response to Kelo demon-
5 See supra note 3.
356 See generally Peller, supra note 291 (characterizing the mainstream liberalism of legal proc-
ess theory as a bulwark against social and legal change).
151 See Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental About Environmental Law in the Su-
preme Court, 47 UCLA L. REV. 703, 737-41 (2000) (explaining how the conservative Supreme
Court defers to the political branch whenever possible regarding environmental statutes).
' See generally Robert Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means: Values, Con-
straints, and Finance in the Design of a Comprehensive and Contemporary American "Ownership Society,"
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strates the disjuncture between the quasi-scientific observations of le-
gal process and the populist sentiments of the public and the anti-
360Kelo coalition.35 9 Taking their cue from the majority decision, po-
litical officials and property rights advocates have responded with a
plethora of constitutional and legislative proposals at the federal and
state level to limit economic development takings 3 61 Although their
actions are consistent with the tenets of legal process that would en-
courage political actors rather than judges to make significant, con-
troversial political decisions, the fact that judicial passivity is deemed
actively offensive by a broad segment of the public is more than a lit-
tle ironic.
Legal process is also a frustrating approach for academics who
would prefer a more candid, rigorous effort to defend or penalize
government efforts to control land use. How does the Court know
that the institutions it presumes are competent, that use procedures it
also presumes are competent, in fact produce decisions that benefit
the public and do not place an excessive burden on individual prop-
erty owners? The answer in Kelo is unclear, because the Court refused
to enunciate a test;362 the answer in Lingle is based on over- and under-
inclusive proxy tests for onerous regulatory burdens;363 and the an-
swer in San Remo is that a frustrated plaintiff who loses in state court
may still file a petition for certiorari and hope for Supreme Court re-
364
view. Although legal process concepts such as institutional settle-
ment and competency certainly have both normative and rhetorical
appeal as principles that suggest offering judicial deference to other
governmental bodies, they suffer as concepts of governance in their
presumptive nature, as the Court's largely procedural answers to sub-
stantive questions demonstrate.
The legal process of the 2005 decisions rests on heroic assump-
tions about an agency's structural, rather than actual, competence. It
takes great effort to perform the difficult empirical task of compara-
tive institutional analysis to identify which institutions more effec-
79 S. CAL. L. REv. 45 (2005) (defining and critiquing the "ownership society"); cf. Lee Anne
Fennell, Homes Rule, 112 YALE L.J. 617, 626-30 (2002) (reviewing FISCHEL, supra note 211, and
detailing home ownership rates, noting the unrepresentative population of homeowners and its
effects on local politics).
.. See Daniel H. Cole, Why Kelo is Not Good News for Local Planners and Developers, GA. ST. U. L.
REV. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=880149 (summarizing the public re-
sponse which "assailed [the ruling] as a death knell for private property rights" in America).
See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489-90 (2005).
s' See National Conference of State Legislatures, State Legislative Response to Kelo, Annual
Meeting 2006, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/natres/annualmtgupdate06.htm (last visited
Nov. 15, 2006).
2 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 486-87.
See supra text accompanying notes 168-72.
See San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 346 (2005).
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tively perform certain tasks-the conclusion to which may not rest at
all on the institution's structural position or procedures.36' Accord-
ingly, the 2005 decisions appear like thin gruel to government advo-
cates as well, given the Court's unwillingness to actively affirm the
state action under review.366 In this regard, Kelo pales considerably in
comparison to Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,"' which almost
eighty years earlier had upheld against constitutional challenge an
early zoning ordinance in part because of the Court's confidence in
the comprehensiveness, "painstaking consideration," and overall wis-
dom of the expert commissions that engaged in land use planning.s s
In Kelo, the majority appeared less confident of the wisdom of the
city's actions, considering it sufficient that New London's procedures
met a process-oriented constitutional baseline.
Merely rejecting or ignoring legal process insights may be no less
frustrating, however. Imagine if the doubts expressed in the San
Remo concurrence about the wisdom of requiring plaintiffs to exhaust
state court remedies, as well as state administrative remedies, bore
fruit and that aspect of Williamson County was overturned.369 Would
the lower federal courts do a fairer, more effective job of resolving
land use disputes? A number of federal judges emphatically think
not.
3 7 0
See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3-13, 271 (1994) (summarizing a "participation-centered ap-
proach to comparative institutional analysis").
See Marc B. Mihaly, Public-Private Redevelopment Partnerships and the Supreme Court: Kelo v.
City of New London, 7 VT.J. ENVrL. L. 41, 42 (2005). This was made even clearer when, after
Kelo was issued, Justice Stevens announced in a public speech that he disagreed with New Lon-
don's redevelopment project as a matter of policy, but felt duty-bound to uphold it in his posi-
tion as a Justice. See Linda Greenhouse, Justice Weighs Desire v. Duty (Duty Prevails), N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 25, 2005, at Al ("The outcomes were 'unwise', he said but 'in each I was convinced that
the law compelled a result that I would have opposed if I were a legislator.'").
7 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483 n.12 (Stevens, J.) (citing Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926)).
s Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394-95; see also Charles M. Haar & Michael Allan Wolf, Euclid Lives: The
Survival of Progressive Jurisprudence, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2158 (2002) (identifying Progressive Era
origins of Euclid and describing the decision's embrace of planning's promised neutral exper-
tise).
San Remo, 545 U.S. at 351-52 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
'70 See, e.g., River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 23 F.3d 164, 165 (7th Cir. 1994) (Easter-
brookJ.) ("Federal courts are not boards of zoning appeals. This message, oft-repeated, has not
penetrated the consciousness of property owners who believe that federal judges are more hos-
pitable to their claims than are state judges. Why they should believe this we haven't a clue;
none has ever prevailed in this circuit. . . ."); Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844
F.2d 461, 467 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner,J.) (affirming a district court's dismissal of a substantive
due process claim, and exclaiming that if the panel were to hold otherwise, "we cannot imagine
what zoning dispute could not be shoehorned into federal court in this way, there to displace or
postpone consideration of some worthier object of federal judicial solicitude. Something more
is necessary than dissatisfaction with the rejection of a site plan to turn a zoning case into a fed-
eral case.... ."). Judges affiliated with the University of Chicago Law School do not hold a mo-
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THE TAKINGS CIA USE
More dramatically, imagine if the Roberts Court decided to over-
turn or limit the majority decision in Kelo and impose a stricter, rule-
like limit under the Public Use Clause on eminent domain actions
that result in the taken property ending up in private hands. The
Court's institutional settlement of its regulatory takings doctrine in
Lingle demonstrates the hurdles facing that effort. After more than a
generation of experimentation with heightened judicial scrutiny of
regulatory actions under the Takings Clause, the Court has decided,
ultimately, to "eat crow" and scale back its regulatory takings juris-
prudence.' Any effort to re-invigorate constitutional property rights
protections under the Takings Clause faces a difficult choice. It
could abandon the Rehnquist Court's ultimate commitment to legal
process theory, and consider some other jurisprudential approach to
constitutional challenges under the Takings Clause. If it decides to
remain within the comforting confines of legal process, it will face the
same doctrinal and adjudicatory challenge of defining the extent of
substantive constitutional property rights and the limits of govern-
mental actions that produced the wondrous complexity of the regula-
tory takings doctrine.' v  We could end up a decade hence with a
muddled Public Use Clause doctrine, with all of the attendantjudicial
confusion and law review commentary. In other words, the Roberts
Court would be required to walk a difficult tightrope between the
passively virtuous respect for political institutions that legal process
prescribes and the substantive intervention into the work those insti-
tutions perform that more fulsome property rights protection would
demand.
nopoly on such sentiment-or on its sarcastic articulation. See, e.g., Hoehne v. County of San
Benito, 870 F.2d 529, 532 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The Supreme Court has erected imposing bari-
ers ... to guard against the federal courts becoming the Grand Mufti of local zoning boards.").
And this judicial preference dates back more than a century. See Kansas ex rel. Tufts v. Ziebold,
(D. Kan.), afj'd, Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (refusing to remove to federal court a
takings case wherein a newly-enacted state prohibition law required shutting down a brewery).
371 See supra text accompanying note 1.
3' Tellingly, one property rights advocate has proposed granting stronger substantive prop-
erty rights protection through administrative procedural reforms-thus seemingly recognizing
the doctrinal and ideological limitations of the legal and political present. See Eric R. Claeys,
That '70s Show: Eminent Domain Reform and the Administrative Law Revolution, 46 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 867, 878-87 (2006) ("Administrative law procedural reforms may screen out many of the
projects that have stoked the backlash against Kelo without forcing legislators to set-
tle.., substantive policy choices .... ."). As the aftermath of the procedural rights reforms of
the 1970s has revealed, however, procedural reforms can frequently have unanticipated conse-
quences that frustrate reformers' intent and do not necessarily force better, or even more care-
ful, regulatory decisionmaking. See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 23, at 350 (noting that efforts
to limit governmental discretion have cut against both stringent and lax government regulation,
depending upon the prevailing political and legal context). See generaliyJim Rossi, Participation
Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REV.
173 (1997) (describing the costs of increased administrative procedures on agency decision-
making).
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The 2005 decisions have placed this dilemma in the foreground.
They may have put to rest some of the major issues arising out of the
Takings Clause, but their efforts are not entirely satisfactory. The fact
that they do so at all, however, is an accomplishment attributable in
no small part to the continuing salience of legal process.
